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Transcending the Debate on Legal Narrative
George H. Taylor
Abstract
Use of the narrative form in law and legal analysis remains controversial. Ad-
vocates such as Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Kathryn Abrams have argued
that narrative in law can elicit particular perspectives and experiences that are re-
duced or bleached away when incorporated into the formalisms of pure doctrinal
studies. By contrast, critics such as Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry maintain
that narratives can distort if they are not sufficiently based on empirical fact or
reason. Narratives, they claim, must be evaluated on the basis of objective stan-
dards.
The Article transcends this divide. In particular, it argues that the valuable func-
tions of legal narrative in law and legal scholarship become visible when their
literary character is examined. The Article undertakes this analysis by a close
study of the narratives of Derrick Bell. The Article maintains that Bell’s narratives
should be read as parables. Parables function literarily by a process of disorien-
tation that at once upsets traditional norms and opens the way for reorientation to
occur.
The Article therefore defends the deployment of legal narrative and concludes
that its critics are guilty of a category mistake. They too frequently analyze legal
narratives on the basis of traditional norms, when the very function of narrative is
to manifest new norms and new understandings.
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 Transcending the Debate on Legal Narrative
George H. Taylor*
What does the literary character of Derrick Bell’s fictional narratives tell us about how 
they should be interpreted?  In his chronicle, The Space Traders,1 for instance, Bell relates the 
tale of alien visitors to the United States who promise the country wealth if it will trade the 
nation’s blacks.2  The country votes decisively for the trade.3  In The Racial Preference 
Licensing Act,4 Bell’s story recounts the decision by a fictional President to permit employers 
and property owners to buy a license that would allow them to discriminate on the basis of color 
and race.5 License fees would be used to support businesses, homeowners, and students in the 
black community.6 What do these stories mean?  Should they be read literally, as though the 
*Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  J.D., Harvard; Ph.D. 
cand., University of Chicago.  My thanks to Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
158-94 (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM].  For further discussion of this 
narrative, see infra text accompanying notes 192-207.
2See id. at 159-60.
3See id. at 192.
4Id. at 47-64.  For further discussion of this narrative, see infra text accompanying notes 
148-90.
5See id. at 47-48.
6See id. at 48-49.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-2- 
country would indeed vote in favor of the aliens’ trade or the establishment of a racial 
preferencing license would in fact more efficaciously resolve racial unrest?  What does the status 
of these stories as “fictions” indicate about their claims–if any–to truth?
Questions of this kind have arisen in the context of a larger debate about the employment 
of narrative in law and legal scholarship.  The charge against the use of narrative–in either 
fictional or nonfictional accounts–is that “stories can distort legal debate, particularly if those 
stories are atypical, inaccurate, or incomplete.”7  Stories must be evaluated, the claim goes, on 
the basis of objective standards of knowledge and reason.8 This Article seeks to transcend the 
existing debate.  My argument is that the valuable function of legal narratives can be understood 
only when we appreciate their literary character.  In particular, the Article contends that 
narratives such as Bell’s should be read as parables.  I analogize the literary nature of Bell’s 
narratives to the use of parable in the Christian Bible’s New Testament,9 a subject that has 
7DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:  THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICA 39 (1997) [hereinafter FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL 
REASON].
8See, e.g., id. at 7.
9Particularly because of the contentiousness of contemporary debate on religious issues, 
let me offer three caveats regarding my recourse to New Testament parable.  First, the goal is to 
examine the literary character of the parable.  I set aside any question, whether favorable or 
antagonistic, of the New Testament’s truth.  Second, invocation of New Testament scholarship is 
not intended to disparage insight from other religious traditions.  For example, recent study of 
New Testament parables has located them as not divided from but “regularly tied inseparably” to 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art11
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received significant attention from New Testament scholars.  The point is not to equate the status 
of Bell’s work with that of the New Testament parable but to attend the similarities in literary 
the larger context of contemporaneous Jewish parable literature.  See, e.g., Craig L. Blomberg, 
The Parables of Jesus:  Current Trends and Needs in Research, in STUDYING THE HISTORICAL 
JESUS: EVALUATIONS OF THE STATE OF CURRENT RESEARCH 231, 234 (Bruce Chilton & Craig A. 
Evans eds., 1994) [hereinafter Blomberg, The Parables of Jesus] (citing the work of Claus 
Westermann).  Further, interpretation of the Hebrew Bible (what Christians call the Old 
Testament) by Jewish scholars has also attempted to recover more broadly the modality of 
manifestation, the theme I pursue in the more restricted context of New Testament parable 
scholarship.  See, e.g., JAMES L. KUGEL, THE GREAT POEMS OF THE BIBLE 35-36 (1999) 
[hereinafter KUGEL, THE GREAT POEMS OF THE BIBLE].  Third, my reliance on New Testament 
scholarship is not intended as a rejoinder on the side of Christianity to criticism by Farber and 
Sherry that “radical multiculturalists,” including Bell, are anti-Semitic. See, e.g., FARBER & 
SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 4, 25-26, 58-59 (criticizing Bell).  See generally
id. at 52-71 (chapter entitled Is the Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?).  (I set aside the question 
whether Bell is in fact a radical multiculturalist, which I think he is not.)  As already suggested, 
my invocation of the New Testament parable is for literary purposes, and Farber and Sherry’s 
charge that radical multiculturalism is anti-Semitic is rejected by other scholars, including those 
otherwise sympathetic to these authors.  See Richard A. Posner, Beyond All Reason, New 
Republic, Oct. 13, 1997 (review of FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 
40, 42) (“I do not think that the critical race theorists are anti-Semites.”).  
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style.10  Just as the New Testament parables should be read on the basis of the criteria of 
manifestation–the manifestation of new knowledge and insight–rather than on the basis of 
adequation–adequation to existing norms and knowledge11–so, I argue, should Bell’s narratives.  
New Testament parables and Bell’s parables both reorient, and they do so by disorienting.12
Part I analyzes recent New Testament scholarship on the parables and describes how the 
parables are understood as vehicles of manifestation.  Significant here is differentiation of a 
parable from an allegory.  Part II demonstrates how Bell’s narratives are properly understood as 
parables. Bell’s narratives should be comprehended as manifesting something new, something 
not appropriately assessed on the basis of their message’s adequation to customary norms or 
understandings.  Part III develops the larger insights of parable scholarship for narrative legal 
theory in general.  Part IV concludes by justifying the Article’s defense of narrative within a 
larger debate raised by Richard Delgado over whether an argument for racial change needs to 
promote a more material and less idealistic–less narrative-oriented–basis for change. 
10Because the Article is concerned with the descriptive characterization of how parable is 
employed both in Bell and the New Testament, let me expand on the prior footnote and 
emphasize that the Article it is not concerned with arguing whether in fact Bell’s stories or the 
New Testament’s in fact reveal “truth.”  The contention is rather that only by understanding the 
literary nature of the message can the reader then be in the position to raise the question of truth.
11See infra text accompanying notes 103-6, contrasting the criteria of manifestation and 
adequation.
12See infra text accompanying notes 98-102, claiming that parables reorient by 
disorienting.
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 I.  New Testament Scholarship on the Parable
The initial presupposition of the New Testament scholarship I shall describe is that its 
text  is not literally the words of God but the product of human–even if divinely inspired–
hands.13  The  books of Matthew, Mark, and Luke (the Synoptic Gospels) relate the story of 
Jesus’s life and ministry,14 but they were written at least forty years after Jesus’s crucifixion.15
Because of this historical distance, scholars have tried to differentiate gospel material that may 
more accurately record statements made by Jesus himself from others inserted by the gospel 
writers and the early Christian communities.  The parables have particularly been subject to this 
analysis because, as Norman Perrin writes, “the parables are perhaps the most characteristic form 
of the speech of Jesus himself.”16  Interpretive inquiry into the parables has proceeded in four 
steps: textual criticism; historical criticism; literary criticism; and the act of interpretation 
itself.17
A. Textual Criticism
Textual criticism establishes the “the text to be interpreted.”18  With modern texts, this is 
13See, e.g., NORMAN PERRIN, THE NEW TESTAMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (1974) 
[hereinafter PERRIN, THE NEW TESTAMENT].
14Id. at 8.
15Id. at 7.
16NORMAN PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM 199 (1976) [hereinafter 
PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM].
17See id. at 9.
18Id. at 2.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-6- 
normally not an issue needing much attention, but where texts have undergone “a considerable
history of transmission, and of interpretation in the process of transmission” or where divergent 
manuscripts exist, textual criticism acts to determine the text.19 In the parables, material can be 
added either internal to the parable or as an added conclusion after it that will potentially change 
the parable’s meaning.20  Let me take as an example from the book of Luke the parable of the 
Good Samaritan, an example both prominent in the literature21 and one whose interpretation we 
shall pursue throughout.  A common reading of this parable would include the following verses:
[29] But [a lawyer], desiring to justify himself, said to Jesus, “And who is my 
neighbor? [30] Jesus replied, “A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, 
and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving 
him half-dead. [31] Now by chance a priest was going down that road; and when 
he saw him he passed by on the other side. [32] So likewise a Levite, when he 
came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. [33]  But a Samaritan, 
as he journeyed, came to where he was; and when he saw him, he had 
19Id.  In other work, Perrin describes the task here as one of “redaction criticism,” a 
separation of what has been added by the redactor (author/editor) of a Gospel volume from what 
more arguably was said by Jesus himself.  See NORMAN PERRIN, WHAT IS REDACTION 
CRITICISM? (1969).  The interpretive task of textual criticism is descriptive.  A larger normative 
inquiry would arise about which books should be included in the Bible.  
20PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 101-02.
21See, e.g., id. at 162 (discussing this parable as his “sample parable”); Thematic Session:  
The Parable of the Good Samaritan, 2 SEMEIA 1-131 (1974).
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compassion, [34] and went to him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and 
wine; then he set him on his own beast and brought him to an inn, and took care 
of him. [35] And the next day he took out two denarii [coins] and gave them to 
the innkeeper, saying, ‘Take care of him; and whatever more you spend, I will 
repay you when I come back.’ [36]  Which of these three, do you think, proved 
neighbor to the man who fell among the robbers?” [37] He said, “The one who 
showed mercy on him.”  And Jesus said to him, “Go and do likewise.”22
Textual criticism argues that the opening verse (29) and the final verse (37) do not belong to the 
original context of the parable. The opening verse provides a transition from prior verses 
separable from the parable, so it is not original to the parable itself.23 The final verse is added to 
create a parallelism with non-original verses preceding the parable, so it is not original either.24
While the parable as it appears in Luke with its surrounding passages is an “exemplary story” 
about the nature of neighborliness,25  isolation of the original text, when conjoined with historical 
22Luke 10:29-37.
23JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, IN PARABLES:  THE CHALLENGE OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS 59 
(1973) [hereinafter CROSSAN, IN PARABLES].  
24See id. at 59-60.  Subsequent commentary raises the question whether verse 36 belongs 
to the original parable.  The interrogatory question posed about who was the good neighbor is 
argued to be extraneous to the distinctive context of the parable as story in verses 30-35.  See 
PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 171 (citing commentary 
by Dan Via).
25See id. at 102.
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and literary interpretation of this passage, leads as we shall see to a strikingly different 
interpretation of the parable.26
B.  Historical Criticism
Historical criticism challenges the view that the Bible can simply be picked up and read 
with its meaning readily decipherable.27  Instead, the task is much more complex.  Writes Perrin:
We need to be able to understand the language in which the text is written, the 
nature of the text itself as a historical and literary artifact, the circumstances in 
which and for which it was written.  We need, further, to understand as far as we 
can the intent of the author in writing the text, and the meaning understood by 
those for whom the text was written.28
26See infra Parts I.B & C.
27James Kugel states the common assumption, which he will then go on to dispute:  “We 
like to think that the Bible, or any other text, means ‘just what it says.’  And we act on that 
assumption:  we simply open up a book–including the Bible–and try to make sense of it on our 
own.”  JAMES L. KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT WAS xv (1997) [hereinafter KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT 
WAS].  Kugel’s particular reference is to the Hebrew Bible, but as the text will go on to discuss, 
interpretation of the New Testament is equally complicated.  This is a problem perhaps 
especially for Protestant readers of the Bible, for whom priority is granted to word over tradition 
and to “the freedom which each individual has of direct access through the Bible to God’s 
disclosure of himself.”  JOHN DILLENBERGER & CLAUDE WELCH, PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY
52-53, 47 n.17 (1954) [hereinafter DILLENBERGER & WELCH, PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY].
28PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 4.  
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In the language of legal scholarship, it seems that the quest is for the “original intent” of a 
biblical passage.29  As foreshadowed in the discussion of textual criticism, the problem of 
extracting the meaning of Jesus’s saying is that the words we have available are the product of 
transmission and interpretation by the Gospel authors/editors and the early Christian 
communities.  To make the issue more stark, Jesus delivered the parables orally; their current 
locution is entirely the product of texts written later by others.30  It is one thing, then, for textual
criticism to try to separate the parables of Jesus from the authors of the Synoptic Gospels; it is 
something else for historical criticism to try to distinguish, internal to the parable, what was 
Jesus’s rather than the editor’s message.  A further complication is that we do not read any 
biblical text naively; our reading is informed by the tradition of interpretation.31 Nevertheless, 
29See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1997) (differentiating 
original intent–the drafters’ subjective intent–from his preferred method of original meaning–
how the language of the text was originally understood).  It is provocative to contrast Justice 
Scalia’s emphasis on legal original meaning–“[i]t is the law that governs, not the intent of the 
lawgiver,” id. at 17–with the emphasis in New Testament interpretation on original intent, on the 
spirit (in the many senses of that word) lying behind Jesus’s use of particular language.  It is also 
enlightening to realize that, as we shall see, the originalist move in New Testament interpretation 
claims to capture in Jesus’s sayings a more unsettling interpretation that contests traditional 
readings while by contrast the recourse to originalism in legal analysis is stereotypically viewed 
as more conservative in orientation.
30See PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 3.  
31See, e.g., Paul Ricoeur, Experience and Language in Religious Discourse, in
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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tools such as comparison of differing accounts in the Gospels32 and assessment of the 
relationship between Jesus’s parables and other contemporaneous Jewish parables33 (mashal)34
have provided some clarity.  Further, historical inquiry into the existing culture of the biblical 
period has proved illumining also.  
For our purposes, the last is especially instructive when we return to our example of the 
parable of the Good Samaritan.  Recall that in that parable three actors separately came upon the 
man who had been beaten and left for dead: a priest, a Levite, and a Samaritan.35  The first two 
walked by, while the last stopped and offered aid.36  Thus stated, the parable seems to offer an 
instructional story of what it means to act as a neighbor.  Historical criticism, though, goes much 
further and asks what would the appearance of a Samaritan mean to Jesus’s Jewish audience.  To 
these Jews a Samaritan was not some faceless, interchangeable placeholder but, quite the 
DOMINIQUE JANICAUD ET AL., PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE THEOLOGICAL TURN 127, 133 (2000) 
(“[A] Scripture free of all interpretation is properly speaking impossible to find.”).  
32See, e.g., PERRIN, THE NEW TESTAMENT, supra note 13, at 8-10.
33See, e.g., Blomberg, The Parables of Jesus, supra note 9, at 234 (citing this 
scholarship).
34See, e.g., DAVID STERN, PARABLES IN MIDRASH:  NARRATIVE AND EXEGESIS IN 
RABBINIC LITERATURE 10 (1991) [hereinafter STERN, PARABLES IN MIDRASH] (noting the 
traditional translation of mashal as parable).
35Luke 10:30-33.
36Luke 10:31-35.
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contrary, “a hated enemy, a half-breed, a perverter of true religion.”37  A Samaritan was a “socio-
religious outcast.”38  To ask  a Jew to conceive of a Samaritan as a neighbor was to ask for the 
conjunction of two terms that needed to be held apart.  Only when we comprehend the original, 
historical significance of the Samaritan can we become open to the real import of this parable.  
To arrive at this interpretation, though, we need to complete textual and historical criticism by 
literary criticism.
C.  Literary Criticism
Literary criticism asks us to take as a serious and independent subject of inquiry the 
nature of the literary form in which a message such as the parable is conveyed.  More 
particularly, the claim is that the literary structure in fact informs the message, both as to content 
and to the way in which the message is conveyed.  The thought content is not “indifferent to its 
literary vehicle.”39 The interpretive possibilities offered by literary criticism are new because 
37ROBERT W. FUNK, LANGUAGE, HERMENEUTIC, AND WORD OF GOD 211 (1966) 
[hereinafter FUNK, LANGUAGE].  Funk adds that “[a]ccording to rabbinic teaching, an Israelite 
was not to accept alms or a work of love from a non-Jew, since Israel’s redemption is thereby 
delayed.”  Id. at 212 n.61 (citations omitted).  See also Robert W. Funk, The Good Samaritan as 
Metaphor, 2 SEMEIA 74, 78-79 (1974) (claiming that for Jews the Samaritan was a “mortal 
enemy”) [hereinafter Funk, The Good Samaritan as Metaphor].
38CROSSAN, IN PARABLE, supra note 23, at 64.  See also id. (“‘For Jews have no dealings 
with Samaritans.’”) (quoting John 4:9).
39PAUL RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 91 (Lewis S. Mudge ed., 1980) 
[hereinafter RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION].
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they can be discerned only through literary analysis; they are valid because they arise from the 
very “nature and natural force of the literary form and language of the texts.”40  For my purposes, 
literary criticism forms the most significant advance in biblical interpretation, and, I shall also 
argue, it comprises the most important source of insight for comprehension of the character of 
Bell’s narratives.  Essential to interpretation of both Jesus’s parables and Bell’s texts is that they 
be comprehended fundamentally as in fact parables and not allegories.
1.  Allegories
The charge of the New Testament scholarship on which I rely is that Jesus’s parables 
have too often been interpreted, including by the authors of the Synoptic Gospels, as allegories, 
not parables.  Allegorical commentary could be inserted in the biblical text, for instance, either 
within or after the parable,41 or later commentary would interpret Jesus’s sayings in allegorical 
form.  As an example of allegory in the biblical text, consider the commentary following the 
parable of the Sower.  The parable talks of seed falling on the path, on rocky ground, among 
thorns, or in good soil.42  But to this message the gospel writer adds several more verses 
allegorizing the parable:  The sower is sowing the word of God. The birds that eat the seed on the 
path are like Satan taking away the word.  The ones on rocky ground hearing the word do not 
have strong enough roots, so in times of affliction fall away.  Those hearing the word among the 
thorns allow other desires to choke out the word, while those on good soil who hear the word 
40PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 9.
41See id. at 8.
42Mark 4:3-8.
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have seeds that will bear fruit.43  Similarly with a modest account of the Good Samaritan parable.  
With the appended editorial commentary, especially the last phrase, “Go and do likewise,” the 
parable tells us how to be a neighbor; it becomes “an allegory of charitable action.”44 The Good 
Samaritan parable has also been allegorized by subsequent interpreters.  For example, under the
more detailed reading by Augustine, the fourth century theologian, the traveler was Adam, the 
thieves were the devil and his cohorts, the priest and Levite portrayed the ministry of the Old 
Testament, the Samaritan was Jesus, and so on.45
So what is the point?  Whether the message be large–the actions of God–or more 
modest–how to be a neighbor–allegory has an educative, didactic, informative function.46  It 
proceeds on the basis of a double meaning.47  There is an overt meaning–the story told–and then 
43Mark 4:14-20.  For discussion of this parable, see, e.g., CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra
note 23, at 39-44, 50-51.
44PAUL RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 241 (Charles E. Reagan & David 
Stewart eds., 1978) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR] (disagreeing with 
this approach).
45PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 94 (so 
summarizing) (citation omitted).
46See, e.g., ROBERT SCHOLES & ROBERT KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE 107 
(1966) [hereinafter SCHOLES & KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE] (referring to allegory as 
“the kind of didactic narrative which emphasizes the illustrative meaning of its characters, 
setting, and action”).  
47Paul Ricoeur, The Nuptial Metaphor, in ANDRE LACOCQUE & PAUL RICOEUR, 
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a meaning underneath that needs to be decoded.48 The overt meaning is a vehicle for the 
expression of the covert meaning.  When this covert meaning is uncovered, when the overt 
meaning is translated into the covert meaning, then the overt text can be discarded.  It has done 
its work, and the covert meaning can stand by itself.49 Under an allegorical reading, the parable 
of the Sower is about the vagaries of belief; faith will grow or not depending on its soil.50  In the 
allegorical accounts of the Good Samaritan parable, either, in Augustine’s terms, the parable 
provides a story about the care provided by Jesus (as opposed to those of the Old Testament), or, 
in the more modest account, it tells how to be a neighbor.  Once the underlying message is 
discerned, its wrapping is no longer of any intrinsic worth.  Once the message is understood, the 
allegory can be discarded.51
THINKING BIBLICALLY 265, 286 (David Pellauer trans., 1998) [hereinafter LACOCQUE & 
RICOEUR, THINKING BIBLICALLY].
48See, e.g., PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 6, 92.
49See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 163 (Emerson Buchanan trans., 
1969) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL] (“An allegory can always be translated
into a text that can be understood by itself . . . .”).
50See, e.g., CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 23, at 44.
51Later we shall examine how allegorical elements may operate within a story that 
remains fundamentally parabolic.  See infra Part I.C.4.  This conjunction may explain the use of 
the subversive allegory in contexts such as the black church, where “allegory has remained a 
vibrant form of proclamation.”  JOHN R. DONAHUE, S.J., THE GOSPEL IN PARABLE 12 (1988) 
[hereinafter DONAHUE, THE GOSPEL IN PARABLE].  There the overt contents of the message are 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art11
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2.  Parables
To explore what is different about parables, let us return to the scholarly explication of 
the  Good Samaritan parable.  Textual criticism has isolated the relevant text,52 and historical 
criticism has demonstrated that the Samaritan was considered an enemy of the Jew.53  The 
Samaritan is someone whom the victim does not expect to help and indeed does not want 
assistance from.54 Linguistic criticism now attends how the language of the text operates.  The 
text asks the listener to put together for the same person two contradictory words: “Samaritan” 
and “neighbor.”  John Dominic Crossan argues: “The whole thrust of the story demands that one 
say what cannot be said, what is a contradiction in terms: Good + Samaritan. . . . [W]hen good 
(clerics) and bad (Samaritan) become, respectively, bad and good, a world is being challenged 
and we are faced with polar reversal.”55  The literal conflict turns over the listener’s world and 
challenges its presumptions.56  The underlying force of the parable, says Crossan, 
not discarded but have their own–parabolic–force.  This example is obviously of interest for 
possible analogies to Bell’s work.  See infra text accompanying notes 212-27.
52See supra Part I.A.
53See supra Part I.B.
54FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 213.
55CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 23, at 64.  
56This disruptive power of parable seems to be retained by a variety of more recent 
interpreters.  See, e.g., DONAHUE, THE GOSPEL IN PARABLE, supra note 51, at 15 (“In terms of 
image and subject matter the parables are realistic, but in the unfolding of the parable the realism 
is shattered.”); Blomberg, The Parables of Jesus, supra note 9, at 232 (maintaining that the 
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is that just so does the Kingdom of God break abruptly into human consciousness 
and demand the overturn of prior values, closed options, set judgments, and 
established conclusions. . . .  The hearer struggling with the contradictory dualism 
of Good/Samaritan is actually experiencing in and through this the inbreaking of 
the Kingdom.  Not only does it happen like this, it happens in this.57
The parable is a language event.58  In and through the force of the parable’s language the 
listener’s experience is transformed; he or she experiences a new reality.59 The parable of the 
Sower operates in a generally similar fashion.  Its emphasis is not fundamentally on growth but 
on the miracle of production occasioned by the small seed.  “It is like this that the Kingdom is in 
advent.  It is surprise and it is gift.”60  The crux, then, is that “the kingdom of God is not what the 
parables tell about, but what happens in parables.”61  The parable is the bearer of the reality with 
parables’ message “regularly subverts conventional wisdom in shocking ways”).  See also id. at 
252 (contrasting his conservative parable scholarship with Donahue’s more liberal scholarship).
57CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 23, at 65-66.  
58FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 220.  See also PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE 
OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 138, 146, 178 (same).
59See Dan O. Via, Parable and Example Story:  A Literary-Structuralist Approach, 1 
SEMEIA 105, 118 (1974) (“The narrative parables . . . give a new vision of everyday existence as 
transected by the surprising incursion of the transcendent.”).
60CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 23, at 50.
61PAUL RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED:  RELIGION, NARRATIVE, AND IMAGINATION 165 
(David Pellauer trans., 1995) [hereinafter RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED].
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which it is concerned.62  That entails that although the language of an allegory can be discarded 
when its underlying message is discovered, that is not true for the parable.63
3.  Parable as Metaphoric
Characterization of the parable as metaphoric provides the crux of the scholarly insight 
about the parable as a literary form64 and clarifies why parable, in contrast to allegory, is not 
eliminable.  The most extended relevant discussion of metaphor arises in Paul Ricoeur’s 
magisterial tome, The Rule of Metaphor,65 so let me briefly summarize his thesis there and then 
turn to the assessment by Ricoeur and others of metaphor in the parable context.  In his more 
general work, Ricoeur concentrates on the “rifts” metaphor creates in an existing order, the 
62PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 55-56.
63See DONAHUE, THE GOSPEL IN PARABLE, supra note 51, at 13.
64See, e.g., PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 123 
(arguing that “consideration of a form of language which uses comparison but which can serve 
as a vehicle for the disclosure of ultimacy [leads] to a consideration of the nature, function, and 
power of metaphor”).
65PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR:  MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE 
CREATION OF MEANING IN LANGUAGE (Robert Czerny trans., 1977) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE 
RULE OF METAPHOR].  To anticipate, note the subtitle:  the creation of meaning in language.
As the Article’s attention to Ricoeur begins to increase, let me clarify my bias.  I studied 
under Ricoeur in graduate school and edited his book on ideology and utopia.  See PAUL 
RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (George H. Taylor ed., 1986) [hereinafter 
RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA].
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processes by which it “disturbs and displaces” order.66 Metaphoric predication arises when there 
is a “clash” in literal meaning; metaphor creates new meaning in the space where there is literal 
contradiction.67  Metaphor destroys the literal order in order to present a new order.68  As 
Ricoeur writes elsewhere, metaphor “break[s] through previous categorization and . . . 
establish[es] new logical boundaries on the ruins of the preceding ones.”69  In his work more 
66RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 65, at 22.
67Id. at 194.  
68RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 65, at 22.  Ricoeur’s emphasis on the 
metaphoric displacement of existing order should be contrasted to the work on metaphor by 
cognitive theorists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Under their approach, the target domain in 
metaphor simply carries over and preserves the source domain.  See, e.g., George Lakoff, What 
is a Conceptual System?, in THE NATURE AND ONTOGENESIS OF MEANING 41, 49 (William F. 
Overton & David S. Palermos eds., 1994) (“The fact that the love is a journey mapping is a fixed 
part of our conceptual system explains why new and imaginative uses of the mapping can be 
understood instantly . . . . [The] metaphorical correspondences are already part of our conceptual 
system.”).  See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH:  THE 
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & 
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH]; METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).  Elsewhere I analyze at 
greater length the contrast between Ricoeur’s model of metaphor and Lakoff and Johnson’s.  See 
George H. Taylor, Cognitive Theory, Conscience, and Law, 6 GRAVEN IMAGES (forthcoming 
2005).
69RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 44, at 131.
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directly on parable, Ricoeur describes the parable as conjoining a metaphorical process with a 
narrative form.70  The bearer of the metaphor is the parabolic narrative as a whole in its tension 
with ordinary life and reality.71  The parable is “the metaphorization of a discourse.”72
The lessons here are several.  First, appreciation of the metaphoric quality of parable is an 
insight into its literary form.  The metaphoric capacity of parable is a prominent theme in 
Ricoeur and other biblical scholars who take seriously literary criticism.73  Second, as a language 
70Paul Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, 4 SEMEIA 27, 30 (1975) [hereinafter Ricoeur, 
Biblical Hermeneutics].  He will subsequently add a third trait of parable, that its qualifier is the
Kingdom of God.  See id. at 32-33. 
71Id. at 95.  In later work, Ricoeur will also talk of the metaphoric process of the 
narrative-parable as arising in the relationship between the parable and the larger narrative that 
encompasses it about the Kingdom of God, the latter “an expression that orients the whole 
process of transgression.”  RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 61, at 147.  Attention to 
the metaphoric role of the parable as a whole helps explain why some parables, such as the 
Sower, see supra text accompanying note 42, can function metaphorically even though 
internally, unlike the Good Samaritan, see supra text accompanying notes 55-57, they do not 
seem to present metaphoric clashes with everyday life.  RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra
note 61, at 147.
72Id. at 161 (emphasis deleted).
73See, e.g., FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 213 (“[In the parable of the Good 
Samaritan] [t]he ‘logic’ of everydayness is broken upon the ‘logic’ of the parable.  It is the 
juxtaposition of the two logics that turns the Samaritan, and hence the parable, into a 
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event, the parable as metaphor is productive:74 it is “creative of meaning,”75 it says “something 
new about reality,”76 it is “revelatory.”77 Third, because the parable lives and is productive in its 
metaphoric moment, in three senses it cannot be reduced to the terms of prior, literal meaning.  
On the one hand, it is a language event: it has force, it transforms.  Further, as creative of 
meaning, it says something new in a way that transforms prior categories.78 Finally, as 
metaphoric, parable “induces a vision of that which cannot be conveyed by prosaic or discursive 
speech.”79 It is “untranslatable.”80  While an allegory points to its underlying meaning and can 
metaphor. . . . If it is the literal meaning of Samaritan that provides the initial jolt to the everyday 
mentality embodied in the story, it is the nonliteral meaning that triggers, through the parable, a
whole new vista . . . .”).  See also id. at 133-62 (chapter on “The Parable as Metaphor”).
74See RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 44, at 245 (“The poetic 
power of the Parable is the power of the Event. . . . Poetic means creative.”).
75FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 137.
76Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 70, at 80.
77PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 129 (“[T]he 
idea of the parable as revelatory image remains central.”).
78See, e.g., Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 70, at 79 (discussing how in 
metaphor “a new signification emerges . . . which has no status in established language and 
which exists only in the attribution of unusual predicates”).
79FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 136.  Since it seems that every contemporary work 
with any kind of religious or theological subject must make reference to Dan Brown’s The Da 
Vinci Code, the following reference from that book seems apt here:  “Metaphors are a way to 
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be discarded when that meaning is found,81 the parable as metaphor cannot be discarded, because 
it is the metaphoric weight and density of the parable that conveys and bears its meaning.82
4.  Allegories Within Parables?
If those scholars who have documented the productive, meaning-full character of parable 
should be lauded for their insights in literary criticism, do they themselves deserve critique for 
their rejection of allegory as also potentially productive and meaning-full?83  Think, for example, 
of one of the parables whose interpretation we have followed, that of the Sower, where seed is 
sown on diversely fertile ground.84 The case for its parabolic interpretation remains strong: the 
miracle of the gift of the seed and its growth acts a symbol of the Kingdom of God.85
Nevertheless, should we dismiss that the parable’s presentation of the varying ground on which 
help our minds process the unprocessible.”  DAN BROWN, THE DA VINCI CODE 341-42 (2003).
80Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 70, at 80 (speaking of metaphor).
81See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
82See PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 135 
(discussing how in the parable the Kingdom of God “confronts us through the power of 
metaphor . . . to be the bearer of reality, to induce vision”).
83Recall the standard division established by these scholars:  “The modern interpretation 
of these parables [of Jesus] begins with the recognition of a literary point:  they are parables and 
not allegories.”  Id. at 6.
84Mark 4:3-8.
85See CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 23, at 51.
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the seed is sown–on the path, on rocky ground, among thorns, and in good soil86–represent 
allegorically the differing kinds of responsiveness of hearers to Jesus’s message?87  More 
recently, scholars, including scholars such as Crossan and Ricoeur who articulated the divide,88
have argued that the separation between allegory and parable may not be as great as once 
thought.89  The debate about the relationship between allegory and parable remains contentious,90
but for our purposes I want to restrict attention to one element.  There seems increased 
86Mark 4:4-8.
87See, e.g., Blomberg, The Parables of Jesus, supra note 9, at 247 (raising the question 
and citing to scholarly discussion of the issue).
88See, e.g., Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 70, at 35; John Dominic Crossan, 
Parable, Allegory, and Paradox, in SEMIOLOGY AND PARABLES  247, 264-78 (Daniel Patte ed., 
1976) [hereinafter Crossan, Parable, Allegory, and Paradox].
89See, e.g., Blomberg, The Parables of Jesus, supra note 9, at 238; DONAHUE, THE 
GOSPEL IN PARABLE, supra note 51, at 12; DAVID GOWLER, WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT 
THE PARABLES? 94 (2000) (citing sources); ARLAND J. HULTGREN, THE PARABLES OF JESUS:  A 
COMMENTARY (2000); IVOR HAROLD ONES, THE MATTHEAN PARABLES 78-79 (1995).  This 
revisionary view of allegory has appeared in non-biblical literary criticism as well.  See, e.g., 
SCHOLES & KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE, supra note 46, at 110-11.
90Compare GOWLER, supra note 89, at 6 (“[M]odern parable scholarship would never 
completely resuscitate the allegorical method.”) with JONES, supra note 89, at 79 (“Allegory in 
itself no longer provides a means of distinguishing authentic Jesus material from inauthentic.”).  
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agreement that allegory may have been used by Jesus in his own presentation of the parables.91
What needs emphasis, though, is that this newer understanding does nothing to diminish the 
larger insight of biblical literary criticism on the parables.  Unlike the traditional allegory, which 
directs attention elsewhere to an underlying meaning and then can be itself discarded,92 the 
language event of the parable produces its meaning.  The parables remain metaphoric, they 
remain productive, they convey and create new meaning, they are non-reducible.93
5.  Parable as Manifestation
How may we summarize the literary critical insight into the productive capacity of the 
metaphoric language event that is parable?  Here I take the parables as exemplary of how 
Ricoeur defines religious texts more generally.  Religious texts are poetic:94 they have the power 
of “breaking through” and “opening.”95  They “ruptur[e] the ordinary.”96  Two essential points 
91See, e.g., DONAHUE, THE GOSPEL IN PARABLE, supra note 51, at 12 (“[T]he adamant 
rejection [of allegory] is not fair to [New Testament] parables or to the manner in which they can 
be represented.  Many of the images in the parables, such as king, vineyard, and servant, have 
overtones from their biblical heritage which suggest that in these cases the individual elements 
may in fact stand for something else, such as God, Israel, or the prophets.”).
92See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
93See supra text accompanying notes 74-80 .
94See RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 61, at 43.  
95RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 104.
96RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 61, at 60.  (“The paradoxical universe of 
the parable . . . is a ‘burst’ or an ‘exploded’ universe.”  Id.)  Perrin writes of how parable 
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must be drawn–points I will argue are also essential in understanding the import of Derrick 
Bell’s work.97  First, in rupturing the ordinary, parables disorient.98  They provoke a tension with 
the ordinary.  They ask us to confront the assumed contradiction between Samaritan and
neighbor99 and so challenge us to reassess literal terms we had assumed and taken for granted.  
But parables “disorient only in order to reorient us.”100  Through the productive power of the 
metaphoric parable, we “discover another way of seeing.”101  So the first essential point is that 
methodologically the parables proceed as “reorientation by disorientation.”102
The second essential point is that the poetic function of parable vivifies “a new concept 
of truth as manifestation–and in this sense as revelation.”103  Ricoeur writes:
[T]he poetic function incarnates a concept of truth that escapes the definition by 
adequation as well as the criteria of falsification and verification.  Here truth no 
longer means verification, but manifestation, i.e., letting what shows itself be. . . . 
It is in this sense of manifestation that language in its poetic function is a vehicle 
“startle[s] the imagination” and “shatter[s] . . . that everyday world.”  PERRIN, JESUS AND THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 106, 199.
97See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 183-86.
98RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 44, at 244.
99See supra text accompanying note 55.
100RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 61, at 281.
101Id.
102RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 44, at 244 (emphasis added).
103RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 98.
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of revelation.104
Parable manifests new meaning; its reorientation by disorientation brings new meaning into 
being.  A concept of truth as manifestation is bound to be troubling, Ricoeur acknowledges, to 
more traditional linguistic analysis.
Linguistic analysis is so heavily determined by the history of the principles of 
verification and falsification that it is very difficult for this school of thought to 
conceive of a concept of truth that would not be taken for granted and defined a 
priori as adequation.  The idea . . . that truth may mean not adequation but 
manifestation seems to be alien to the main thesis of linguistic analysis. . . .105
Theories of adequation and verification assume the propriety of testing insights by their 
congruence to established norms and truths.  They do not appear to allow for the manifestation of 
new truths, new revelations.  For manifestation may confront, disrupt, and displace old truths in 
order to bring new ones to light.  “[M]etaphor,” writes Ricoeur, “not only shatters the previous 
structures of our language, but also the previous structures of what we call reality. . . . With 
metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of both language and reality.”106
104Id. at 102 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 96 (“I will seek the traits of a truth capable 
of being spoken of in the terms of manifestation rather than verification.”), id. at 98 (“[L]et us 
allow the space of the manifestation of things to be . . . .”); RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, 
supra note 61, at 72 (“[T]he process of revelation is a permanent process of opening something 
that is closed, of making manifest something that was hidden.”).
105Id. at 36.
106RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 44, at 132-33.  Dan Stiver finds in 
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6.  The Role of the Reader
The final element of the literary critical inquiry assesses the role played by the reader.  
The parable as metaphor disorients by presenting a clash with known reality: the juxtaposition 
of Samaritan and neighbor.  At the same time the metaphor reorients by producing new 
meaning–the Samaritan is a neighbor–but the meaning must be grasped and completed by the 
reader.107  The parable is in need of interpretation.108  In part the ability of the individual to
interpret depends on the audience to which a text is addressed: does it speak primarily to those 
who already believe or, like the parable, to the “whole people.”109  But the ability to interpret 
also depends on the individual’s own openness to the message.  On the one hand, the reader may 
grasp the metaphor, but on the other may also refuse it, reject it, want to reduce it to accustomed 
literal terms, or not allow it to work.110 In the parable, comments Robert Funk, “the hearer is 
Ricoeur’s analysis of metaphor and narrative keys to “the cognitive disclosiveness of religious 
language.”  DAN R. STIVER, THEOLOGY AFTER RICOEUR 249 (2001) [hereinafter STIVER, 
THEOLOGY AFTER RICOEUR] (emphasis added). 
107Ricoeur argues this is true of all reading.  See 3 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE
159 (Kathleen Blamey & David Pellauer trans., 1988).  (“It is only in reading that the dynamism 
of configuration completes its course.”).  
108See Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 70, at 133.
109Id. at 132-33 (distinguishing the openness of the parable from eschatological 
discourse–treatment of the final days –which principally addresses “the relatively closed audience 
of believers already initiated into this mode of discourse”).
110See, e.g., MARY ANN TOLBERT, PERSPECTIVES ON THE PARABLES 43 (1979) 
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confronted with a situation in relation to which he must decide how to comport himself: is he 
willing to allow himself to be the victim, to smile at the affront to the priest and Levite, to be 
served by an enemy?  The parable invites, nay, compels him to make some response.  And it is 
this response that is decisive for him.”111  The response is not foreordained by the operation of 
the parable itself.  The contingency of listener response is well reflected in the parable of the 
Sower: no matter what the quality of the seed, the quality of the ground in which it is sown will 
make a difference in how well it flourishes.112
[hereinafter TOLBERT, PERSPECTIVES ON THE PARABLES] (“Parable interpreters may in the 
process of working with the text find that it teases or intrigues the mind into meaningful insight, 
or they may find that it does not.  Such insight, if it occurs, results from the interaction of text 
and interpreter and not from the domination of either one by the other.”).  Cognitive psychology 
emphasizes the role played by the reader.  In the first place, “[i]t is never easy to bring about a 
change of mind . . . .”  HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS 92 (2004) [hereinafter GARDNER, 
CHANGING MINDS].  Further, change is even more difficult when reader resistance is strong.  See 
id. at 18, 211.
111FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 214.
112See Mark 4:3-8.  As we close discussion of literary criticism of the parables, let me 
briefly summarize some of the theological debate occasioned by the literary critical enterprise. 
Since, for purposes of the Article, I am less concerned with theological questions than with the 
possible adoption more generally of any interpretive insights gained here, my attention to the 
theological debate will be only suggestive.  To the extent the debate is germane for questions of 
more general interpretive analysis, I will return to those issues at a later point.  See infra note 
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329.
Literary criticism first participates in the debate over the role played by the reader of or 
listener to Jesus’s sayings and the Gospel more generally.  As evident from the parable of the 
Sower, see supra, the debate here is a longstanding one over whether an individual’s belief turns 
on individual decision (i.e., the receptivity of his or her soil) or on the gift of divine grace or 
both.  Consider a traditional Protestant account:  “Luther and Calvin affirmed that faith is both a 
gift and a decision.  Without the gift, the decision is not related to the experience of God’s 
forgiving love.  Yet the experience of God’s mercy, and the affirmation that God has led one to 
this experience, do not vitiate decision.”  DILLENBERGER & WELCH, PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY, 
supra note 27, at 31.
Second and more importantly, the literary critical approach is itself subject to debate 
because in its emphasis on the alleged productive of the parable as metaphor, it appears to 
conflate the operation of language with the operation of divine grace.  As one commentator 
notes, “The impression arises that at times salvation comes from metaphor alone!”  DONAHUE, 
THE GOSPEL IN PARABLE, supra note 51, at 104.  Hans Frei provocatively criticizes that the 
literary critical approach in fact renders Jesus as allegorical:  he represents the embodiment–and 
only that–of an underlying, more generally available process of the poetic production of 
meaning.  See Hans Frei, The “Literal Reading” of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition:  
Does It Stretch or Will It Break?, in THE BIBLE AND THE NARRATIVE TRADITION 36, 48 (1986) 
[hereinafter Frei, The “Literal Reading” of Biblical Narrative].  For a defense of Ricoeur, see, 
e.g., STIVER, THEOLOGY AFTER RICOEUR, supra note 106, at 245 (differentiating Ricoeur’s 
philosophy from his theology).
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D.  The Act of Interpretation
Textual criticism, historical criticism, and literary criticism all subserve the final stage in 
the analytic process: the act of interpretation itself.113  Here my concern is less the act of 
interpretation by the believer–already adverted to briefly just above114–than by a scholarly 
undertaking that employs the rigors of critical analysis (which is perhaps undertaken by believers 
but perhaps also not).  I am also interested in a more self-critical assessment of how the 
interpretive process proceeds.  In this inquiry, the parable and religious discourse become 
subsumed within more general poetic phenomena.
1. Understanding
The initial premise here is that there are legitimate modes of thought and experience other 
than those that have predominated in the lineage of Western philosophy.115  And these 
113PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 9.
114See supra text accompanying note 110.
115See LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, THINKING BIBLICALLY, supra note 47, at xvi.  As Ricoeur 
elsewhere discusses, elements of Western philosophy may in fact not be immune to these 
alternatives.  He observes that Kant invokes a
power of the imagination “to present” (Darstellung) those ideas of reason for 
which we have no concept.  By means of such representation, the imagination 
“occasions much thought (viel zu denken) without however any definite thought, 
i.e., any concept, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be 
completely compassed and made intelligible by language.”
RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 116 (quoting Immanuel 
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alternative–poetic–forms of expression must be recovered and renewed.  We hearken back to the 
contrast between manifestation and adequation and the need to preserve and protect a space for 
the former against the rule of the latter.  We have, Ricoeur writes, “uncritically accept[ed] a 
certain concept of truth defined as adequation to real objects and as submitted to a criterion of 
empirical verification.”  By contrast, language in its poetic function suspends “the reign of truth 
as adequation and the very definition of truth in terms of verification” in order to liberate a 
“more primitive, more originary” domain.116  James Kugel writes of a lost manner of seeing.  A 
careful reading of the Hebrew Bible demonstrates, he says, that “a certain way of perceiving . . . 
has gradually closed inside of us, so that nowadays most people simply do not register, or do not
have access to, what had been visible in an earlier age.”117  We must remember, though, he adds, 
that what was “otherwise” is “not unrelated to what exists in the fullest reality of today.”118
KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 157 (J.H. Bernard trans., 1966)).  I am currently editing for 
potential publication a series of course lectures where Ricoeur devoted more systematic attention 
to the development in Western philosophy of attention to the imagination.  See PAUL RICOEUR, 
LECTURES ON IMAGINATION:  IMAGINATION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM (George H. Taylor 
ed., forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IMAGINATION].
116RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 101.
117KUGEL, THE GREAT POEMS OF THE BIBLE, supra note 9, at 35-36.
118JAMES L. KUGEL, THE GOD OF OLD:  INSIDE THE LOST WORLD OF THE BIBLE 199 
(2003) [hereinafter KUGEL, THE GOD OF OLD].  See also KUGEL, THE GREAT POEMS OF THE 
BIBLE, supra note 9, at 36 (arguing that biblical texts not only bear witness to a different way of 
seeing but “perhaps invite us, with the use of some spiritual imagination, to try to enter into it, 
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Kugel, Ricoeur, and others try to recapture the kind of seeing available in myth.119  The task is to 
become open to the poetic manifestation.  This task is perhaps best captured in the metaphor not 
of seeing but of listening or hearing–of attending to and opening oneself to what is expressed.  
“This hearing which understands,” Ricoeur writes, “is the crux of our problem.”120 To listen is 
first to attempt to understand, not to critique; it is to offer oneself to “the possible mode of being-
open our eyes, and look”).
119See, e.g., KUGEL, THE GOD OF OLD, supra note 118, at 15-18; PAUL RICOEUR, THE 
CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS 284 (1969) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE CONFLICT OF 
INTERPRETATIONS] (“Something is discovered, unconcealed, which, without myth, would have 
remained covered, concealed.”); id. at 300 (discussing the power of myth “to open and 
uncover”).  In a fictional account, the world of Greek myth is wonderfully and lyrically evoked 
in ROBERTO CALASSO, THE MARRIAGE OF CADMUS AND HARMONY (Tim Parks trans., 1993).  
See, e.g., id. at 280 (“For centuries people have spoken of the Greek myths as of something to be 
rediscovered, reawoken.  The truth is it is the myths that are still out there waiting to wake us and 
be seen by us, like a tree waiting to greet our newly opened eyes.”).
120RICOEUR, THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 450.  See also
KUGEL, THE GOD OF OLD, supra note 118, at 200 (“[T]hese texts have always been there, ready 
to do the talking, if only we are ready to listen.”); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
462 (2d, rev’d ed., Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 1992) [hereinafter GADAMER, 
TRUTH AND METHOD] (“[T]he primacy of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon 
. . . .”); id. at 465 (“The hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor:  that of uninterrupted 
listening.”).
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in-the-world which the text opens up and discloses.”121  Understanding is the opposite of self-
projection; it rather allows “the work and its world [to] enlarge the horizon of my own self-
understanding.”122  As Ricoeur writes specifically of the parables, we need to permit the work’s 
“poetic power [to] display itself within us.”123
2.  Interpretation
To allow the poetic its power to display is to think on the basis of the poetic display, on 
the basis of what the metaphor, parable, or symbol gives, the transformative meaning it 
creates.124  Recognition here must be retained that in order to be true to the poetic meaning, it 
cannot be reduced; it meaning is not transparent but opaque, rich, thick, and inexhaustible.125  At 
121PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 177 (John B. Thompson 
trans. & ed., 1981) [hereinafter RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES].
122RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 44, at 145.
123Id. at 245. 
124In an early formulation, Ricoeur argues that the symbol “gives rise to” thought.  See, 
e.g., RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 299; RICOEUR, THE 
SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, supra note 49, at 348 (same).
125See, e.g., RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 290 
(differentiating signs which are transparent from symbolic signs, which are opaque and have an 
“inexhaustible depth”).  See also JAMES FODOR, CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTICS:  PAUL RICOEUR AND 
THE REFIGURING OF THEOLOGY 239 (1995) (discussing how for Ricoeur retaining the power of 
biblical narratives “means diligently and tirelessly resisting the temptation to exchange the rich 
tapestry of originary discourse for a set of cold abstractions and lifeless concepts”).
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the same time, the poetic gift must be interpreted.126  Analytic tools must be brought to bear to 
try to sort out and decipher what the poetic means.  Ricoeur has described this movement from 
the figurative to the conceptual as an inherent dynamism.127  In other work, Ricoeur advocates an 
approach to interpretation conceived as functioning at the intersection between “two domains, 
metaphorical and speculative. . . . On one side, interpretation seeks the clarity of the concept; on 
the other, it hopes to preserve the dynamism of meaning that the concept holds and pins 
down.”128
How does this tension between symbol and thought or the metaphoric and the speculative 
operate?  Ricoeur’s answer is unabashed.  The relationship is circular: “We must understand in 
order to believe, but we must believe in order to understand.”129  We must believe in order to 
understand:  the interpreter will never come near to what a text says unless he or she lives “in the 
126See, e.g., Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 70, at 35 (maintaining that 
religious language “implies a tension between ‘image’ and ‘meaning’ which calls for 
interpretation.  Nowhere is religious discourse freed of a minimal attempt to interpret it.”).  
127See id. at 133.
128RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 65, at 303.  In preserving this 
dynamism, he therefore rejects “destruction of the metaphorical by the conceptual.”  Id.
“Between the concept which kills the symbols and pure conceptual silence, there must be room 
for a conceptual language which preserves the tensive character of symbolic language.”  Ricoeur, 
Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 70, at 36.
129RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, supra note 49, at 351; RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF 
INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 298 (same).
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aura of the meaning that is sought.”130 The interpreter need not necessarily “‘believe-with,’” 
share the faith of the home community or the individual author, but “reading and interpretation 
through imagination and sympathy [are] the minimum condition for access to the meaning of 
the[] texts.”131  In two senses we must also understand in order to believe.  We must decipher the 
poetic meaning by interpretation,132 and we must apply interpretive tools–such as textual 
criticism, historical criticism, and literary criticism–so that we may hear again,133 so that we may 
hear what the text is trying to say.
Does the interpretive circle permit critique?  Yes.  The circle is not viciously circular–
tautologous, simply self-confirming–but alive and dynamic.134 More broadly, Ricoeur 
differentiates the elements of understanding as comprised of both understanding–the sympathetic 
regard for meaning–and explanation–analytic inquiry.135 Understanding is mediated by 
explanation.136  Return to the example just noted of the employment of textual criticism, 
130Id.; RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, supra note 49, at 351 (same).
131LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, THINKING BIBLICALLY, supra note 47, at xvii.  
132See supra text accompanying note 125.
133RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, supra note 49, at 351.
134See id. at 351; RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 298 
(same).
135See, e.g., Paul Ricoeur, What is a Text?  Explanation and Understanding, in RICOEUR, 
HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 121, at 145.
136See RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 121, at 220.  I 
have explored this interrelation at greater length elsewhere.  See George H. Taylor, Critical 
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historical criticism, and literary criticism in interpretation of the parables.  The goal is 
understanding, but the analysis is also critical: it challenges and undermines the sufficiency of 
allegorical interpretation of the parables.137  When Ricoeur claims that interpretation functions at 
the intersection of domains on the one hand seeking “the clarity of the concept” and on the other 
hoping “preserve the dynamism of meaning,”138 that is the intersection of explanation and 
understanding.
In recognition of this interplay between understanding and explanation, Ricoeur argues, 
for example, that religious testimony itself must be subject to interpretation, to testing.  
Testimony comprises both manifestation and a crisis of appearance.139  Distinction must be 
drawn “between the false witness and the truthful one.”140  Those works and signs of 
manifestation are liable to judgment.141 The kind of judgment available is one of probability, not 
certainty.  We remain within the requirements of a sphere of manifestation rather than one of 
adequation.142
Hermeneutics:  The Intertwining of Explanation and Understanding as Exemplified in Legal 
Analysis, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1101 (2000).
137See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
138RICOEUR, RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 65, at 303.
139RICOEUR, ESAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 146.
140Id. at 112.
141Id. at 146.
142See id. at 150 (“In terms of the modality of judgment, the interpretation of testimony is 
only probable, but it only appears as such when compared to a scientific ideal which governs 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-36-
II.  Bell’s Narratives
On the basis of the analysis of parables just completed, I now turn to argue that Derrick 
Bell’s fictional narratives are best understood as parables.143  I argue for this characterization 
even though Bell in his own writings more frequently refers to his fictions as allegories144 and 
only one of the different requirements of thought, which reigns in only one of the centers of 
reflection, namely knowledge of objects.”).
143Setting aside his textbooks, Bell has written seven other books.  Four of these contain 
fictional narratives.  See DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES (1998) [hereinafter BELL, 
AFROLANTICA LEGACIES]; DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS:  PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN ALIEN 
LAND CALLED HOME (1996) [hereinafter BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS]; BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, 
supra note 1; and DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED].  Bell’s remaining three books are 
nonfictional.  See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS:  BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004) [hereinafter BELL, SILENT COVENANTS]; 
DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION:  LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH (2002) 
[hereinafter BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION]; DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: 
REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER (1994) [hereinafter BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY].  
I will concentrate on representative narratives from the four books of fiction.
144See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 143, at 78; BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, 
supra note 1, at xiii, 12; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 143, at 6; Derrick Bell, The 
Power of Narrative, 23 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 315, 316 (1999) [hereinafter Bell, The Power of 
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only rarely as parables145 or as “metaphorical tales.”146  As we shall see, some of his narratives 
do include allegorical elements, but my contention is that even in these stories, the nature of their 
ultimate message signifies the operation of a parable.147  As is perhaps appropriate, I undertake 
Narrative].  Bell has also characterized certain individual narratives of his as allegories.  See, 
e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 143, at xii (describing The Citadel, id. at 1); id. at 117 
(describing The Chronicle of the Twenty-Seventh- Year Syndrome, in BELL, AND WE ARE NOT 
SAVED, supra note 143, at 198); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 135 (describing 
A Law Professor’s Protest, id. at 127); Bell, The Power of Narrative, supra, at 345 (describing 
The Space Traders, in BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 158); Bell, An Allegorical 
Critique of the United States Civil Rights Model, in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW 3 
(Bob Hepple & Erika M. Szyszczak eds., 1992) (publishing a variation of The Racial Preference 
Licensing Act, in BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47).
145BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 143, at 38; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra
note 143, at 253.  
146Id. at 6.  Later in the book, Bell’s narrators raise the suspicion that the listeners (or 
readers) of his tales will view them as “merely metaphorical essays.”  Id. at 253.
147See infra text accompanying notes 212-27, 262.  My treatment of parable in legal 
scholarship appears distinctive.  Recourse to parable has appeared on a number of occasions in 
legal scholarship.  See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE BROTHEL BOY AND OTHER PARABLES OF THE 
LAW (1992); E. Allan Farnsworth, Parables about Promises, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2002); 
Steven D. Smith, Religion, Democracy, and Autonomy:  A Political Parable, 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 685 (2001); Patrick J. Long, The Good Samaritan and Admiralty: A Parable of a Statute 
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this analysis through recourse to Bell’s stories themselves and let them help unfold the nature of 
his literary method and message.
A.  The Racial Preference Licensing Act
One of the most forceful of Bell’s tales is The Racial Preference Licensing Act, 148 which 
I referred to briefly in the introduction.149  In that story the President acknowledges that racial 
Lost at Sea, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 591 (2000); John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment 
Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470 (1997); Martha Minow, Some Realism About Rulism: A 
Parable for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2249 (1989).  In this work, however, parable is employed, not thematized.  Discussion of parable 
as a subject within legal scholarship is much more infrequent.  See, e.g., G. Edward White, The 
Parable as Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1508 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT BURT, TWO 
JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988)); Robert A. Burt, Constitutional 
Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984).  White criticizes Burt’s book as 
a parable that prioritizes the structure of an argument over evidence in support of it.  See, e.g., 
White, supra, at 1519.  Burt’s book, says White, “is a parable presented as legal scholarship.”  
Id. at 1526.  Burt’s article explores the analogy between the degree to which the parables and the 
courts do and do not rely on command to ensure assent.  See, e.g., Burt, supra, at 502.  It is, of 
course, ironic that White criticizes as parabolic Burt’s book (which, as it happens, does not make 
reference to parable), while Burt’s article defends recourse to parable.  I return to the substantive 
themes raised by White and Burt in Part III infra.
148See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47-64.
149See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
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tolerance does not exist150 and that laws that attempt to police and change individuals’ morals are 
difficult to enforce.151  State-enforced policies of racial integration have not been effective.152  In 
an effort to replace failed action on the basis of ethics with action based on the marketplace, the 
President signs into law the Racial Preference Licensing Act.153  The Act permits employers and 
property owners to buy a license that would allow them to discriminate on the basis of race and 
color.154 Licensees can therefore refuse to hire minority employees, serve minority customers, or 
house minority tenants.  License holders are required to display their license prominently, so that 
potential customers and employees–both those white and those of color–know clearly the 
establishment’s discriminatory preferences.155  The Act would eliminate racial subterfuge and 
tokenism.156  License fees would be employed to support black businesses, provide black home 
buyers no-interest mortgage loans, and to grant educational scholarships for black students.157
The Act replaces “idealism” with “realism.”158  It “maximizes freedom of racial choice.”159
150Id. at 47.
151Id. at 51.
152See id. at 49.
153Id. at 51.
154See id. at 47-48.
155Id.
156See id.
157See id. at 48-49.
158Id. at 49.
159Id. at 52.
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What is Bell’s larger objective in telling this story?  “‘You have to make people see.’”160
A return to the analytic model of textual criticism, historical criticism, literary criticism, and the 
act of interpretation will assist our unfolding of what Bell means here.  It might seem that the 
issue of textual criticism–the text to be interpreted161–would be nonproblematic in a text of 
recent vintage such as Bell’s.  The question, however, raises some complexities.  Consider, for 
instance, that the chapter entitled The Racial Preference Licensing Act consists of both the story 
of the President’s signing of the Act162 and a subsequent dialogue about the story between the 
narrator (purportedly Bell) and his fictional interlocutor, Geneva Crenshaw,163 whom the narrator 
identifies as the author of the story about the Act.164 Both parts of the chapter are fictional, but 
do we consider them both part of the same fiction?  In general, I will want to distinguish the 
story from the dialogue, which provides a fictional commentary on the story.  I do not minimize 
the literary quality of the dialogue.  The dialogue about the story presents a useful twist in that 
160Id. at 60.  I will return to the methodological significance of the statement.  See infra
text accompanying note 297.
161PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 2.
162BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47-52.
163Id. at 52-64.  As apparent, some interesting issues of authorship arise here also.  If the 
story of the Act is by Crenshaw, does it “really” represent Bell’s point of view?  If a statement in 
the dialogue, such as “You have to make people see,” see supra text accompanying note 160, is 
by Crenshaw, does it in fact represent Bell’s perspective?  Do the narrator’s?  Since my purpose 
lies elsewhere, I shall elide these questions and generally read conclusory statements as Bell’s.
164Id. at 52.
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the story is explained not by Bell but by Crenshaw, and Bell as fictional narrator works to come 
to terms with Crenshaw’s story.  The dialogue therefore appears less instrumental, less operating 
toward a predetermined goal or outcome and instead more reflective of an actual debate over 
contested issues.  The dialogue brings the debate alive.  Nevertheless, my own focus will be 
more on the story than on the succeeding commentary, a division similar to scholarly assessment 
of the parables, where the text to be interpreted is the parable, and the Gospel writer’s 
commentary is separable.165  It is true that unlike in the New Testament, Bell is the author of 
both the story and the subsequent dialogue.  But, as we shall discuss,166 the poetic power of 
Bell’s fictions arise more in the story; the commentary acts to explicate the story.167
Perhaps most relevant for our appropriation of historical criticism is its requirement that 
we appreciate “the circumstances in which and for which [the text] was written.”168 Although 
Bell’s writing is close to us in time, understanding of its circumstances may vary depending on 
the age of the reader and his or her prior knowledge of the civil rights movement.  Both the story 
of the Act and the following dialogue do provide significant assistance.  The story relates that 
165See supra text accompanying notes 18-26.
166See infra text accompanying notes 182-90 & note 190.
167Where Bell combine story and explication, this replicates the combination some 
scholars argue was expected in parable utterances at the time of Jesus.  See STERN, PARABLES IN 
MIDRASH, supra note 34, at 8-9.  Some of Bell’s stories, however, include no commentary.  See, 
e.g., Bell, The Space Traders, in BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 158-94.  For 
discussion of this narrative, see infra Part II.B.
168PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 4.
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enforcement of various civil rights statutes has been “unenthusiastic” and judicial decision 
narrow.169 The dialogue affirms that events have rendered obsolete the traditional civil rights 
goals of integration.170  And, the dialogue continues, any advances in minority protection is due 
to “white self-interest.”171  Knowledgeable readers of Bell’s corpus will verify that the story of 
the Racial Preference Licensing Act crystallizes Bell’s long-held view that the civil rights course 
promoting integration was due to fail and has in fact failed.172
We come to the crux of our inquiry into Bell’s story in assessing it on the basis of literary 
criticism.  The argument here is that the narrative is a parable: a language event.173  Through the 
force of the story of the Act, the reader’s understanding is transformed.174 As in the biblical 
parable, Bell’s story is metaphoric.  Recall that metaphor causes “rifts” in, it “disturbs and 
displaces” the existing order.175  The story of the Racial License Preferencing Act strikes at and 
unsettles existing civil rights norms.  Many readers–for example, my students–are quite taken 
169BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 49.
170See id. at 53.
171See id. at 54.
172Note, for example, the subtitle of the book in which the chapter on the Act appears:  
“The Permanence of Racism.”  See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1.
173See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
174Or the reader’s understanding can be transformed, if the reader is open to the story’s 
message.  See infra text accompanying notes 263-70.
175RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 65, at 22.  See supra text 
accompanying note 66.
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aback by the story’s attack on assumed presuppositions and priorities.  Whereas the parable of 
the Good Samaritan required listeners to juxtapose two entities–Samaritan and neighbor–they 
had thought contradictory,176  Bell’s tale asks readers to recognize as impossible of fulfilment 
something–integration–they had taken as an unquestioned norm.  In both cases the challenge 
operates as a reversal.177
The disruption of existing norms provides the basis for the metaphoric moment of 
creation:  the productive event that transforms prior categories.178  The story’s call for “[r]acial 
realism”179 at once acknowledges the failure of an integration model of civil rights and at the 
same affirms the availability of another way to proceed.  Market-driven economic analysis 
replaces the idealism of moral advocacy.180  Endorsement of this law and economics approach 
provides another level of reversal to the story, as law and economics is stereotypically deemed to 
176See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
177See supra text accompanying note 55.  In other of his writings, Bell has characterized 
how critical race theory disrupts prior reality, see Derrick Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race 
Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899 [hereinafter Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race 
Theory?], and how narrative can affect listeners, “‘engendering seemingly irreconcilable 
perceptions of societal attitudes.’”  Bell, The Power of Narrative, supra note 144, at 347 (quoting 
Stephen Shie-Wei Fan, Immigration Law and the Promise of Critical Race Theory:  Opening the 
Academy to the Voices of Aliens and Immigrants, 97 C OLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1216 (1997)).
178See supra text accompanying note 78.
179BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47.
180See id. at 47, 51.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
-44-
be conservative in its aims.181  The story’s theme is shocking; it has a force that subsequent 
explication–whether here or in Bell’s subsequent dialogue–does not fully present.  The 
metaphoric power of the message is not adequately “conveyed by prosaic or discursive 
speech.”182  Bell’s dialogue on the Act allows the reader to hold the theme at arms-length; that is 
not the case in the story itself.  The story has a poetic power: it breaks through the old and opens 
new vistas.183  Its method, like the New Testament parables, is “reorientation by 
disorientation.”184
In bringing forward something new, Bell’s story must be assessed on the basis not of its 
adequation to old categories or norms,185 not on the basis of verification but of “manifestation, 
181See, e.g., ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS 53-56 (1990) (discussing this 
point).  Richard Delgado has also employed law and economics for progressive purposes.  See 
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap:  Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating 
Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 244 (1998) (arguing for the use of market 
incentives to induce positive employer behavior toward racial minorities).
182FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 136 (discussing New Testament parable).  See 
supra text accompanying note 79.
183See supra text accompanying note 95.
184RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 44, at 244.  Cf. BELL, 
CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 143, at 161-62 (discussing how vanguard artists “create a 
new convention, sometimes building on, but more often exceeding and threatening accepted 
conventions”).
185See RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 36.
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i.e., letting what shows itself be.”186  The reader’s primary task is one of understanding, of 
opening oneself to the new world being disclosed.187  The reader must try to live “in the aura of 
the meaning that is sought,”188 must try to read with “imagination and sympathy.”189  Critique is 
possible but only on the basis first of understanding.  Part of the force of the story of the 
Licensing Act is that the reader’s understanding remains uncertain: is advocacy of the license 
really intended by Bell or is the story more rhetorical, more exhortative?190  Because of its poetic 
186Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
187See RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 121, at 177.  See 
supra text accompanying note 121.
188RICOEUR, THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 298.  See supra text 
accompanying note 130.
189LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, THINKING BIBLICALLY, supra note 47, at xvii.  See supra text 
accompanying note 131.
190The story’s power may in fact be somewhat undercut by the succeeding dialogue, 
where Geneva Crenshaw states that in fact her intention was to provoke and “‘not . . . to urge 
actual adoption of a racial preference licensing law.’”  BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 
1, at 60.  Later she argues that even if traditional civil rights advocates resisted the Act, they still 
might have their consciousness sufficiently raised by the story so that they might seek other new 
avenues for reform.  Id. at 62.  Bell may have thought the dialogue’s caveat necessary because, 
in Crenshaw’s words, “‘I could not leave it to you to figure out the real significance of my 
story.’”  Id. at 52.  If read as intended literally, the Act’s proposal might be deemed so 
oppositional to prior norms that it would simply be rejected out of hand and its message for 
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power, the story seems definitely a parable in character.  Further, there is little evidence of 
allegorical overtones.
B. The Space Traders
As briefly noted previously,191 The Space Traders192 tells the story of alien visitors to the 
United States who promise the country prosperity–wealth, environmental decontaminants, and so 
on193–if in return, the nation’s people will allow the space traders to transport home with them all 
of this country’s blacks.194  The issue receives significant debate, and the vote goes decisively in 
favor of the trade.195  As in The Racial License Preferencing Act,196 decision does not take place 
on the basis of what is right or moral.197  Instead, despite the profound injustice, protection of 
change hence dismissed also.  Crenshaw’s interjection that she needed to clarify the text’s 
meaning reiterates the seeming symbiosis, noted earlier, see supra note 163, between the story 
and its expositor.
191See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
192See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 158-94.  In his latest work, Bell 
returns briefly to this narrative.  See BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 143, at 47-48.
193See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 159-60.
194See id. at 160.
195See id. at 192.
196See supra text accompanying note 180.
197See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 171:  “Golightly [a black character] 
had done what he so frequently criticized civil rights spokespersons for doing:  he had tried to 
get whites to do right by black people because it was right that they do so.  ‘Crazy!’ he 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art11
-47-
white self-interest prevails.  As one black character in the story argues, “‘It has become an 
unwritten tradition in this country for whites to sacrifice our rights to further their own 
interests.’”198
Along with Bell’s emphasis on racial realism, noted in the prior story of the Licensing 
Act,199 the theme of white self-interest is one of the most perduring in Bell’s corpus.200 How 
does our interpretive method help us better comprehend the story of The Space Traders?
Analysis on the basis of textual criticism would be rather brief.  The chapter in which the 
narrative appears includes only the story; there is no accompanying explanatory dialogue, as 
there was in the Licensing Act tale.201  Some might raise the question whether the length of the 
story fits within the seemingly more confined textual ambit of a parable, but the time taken to 
read or narrate the tale may well cohere with the actual spoken time of Jesus’s parables, whose 
commented when civil rights people did it.  ‘Crazy!’ he mumbled to himself, at himself.”
198Id. at 174.
199See supra text accompanying notes 179-80.
200For more expansive discussion of these themes, see George H. Taylor, Racism as “the 
Nation’s Crucial Sin”:  Theology and Derrick Bell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 269 (2004) 
[hereinafter Taylor, Racism as “the Nation’s Crucial Sin”].
201See supra text accompanying notes 162-67.  The tale is later described as written by 
Crenshaw.  See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 195.  The Epilogue that follows 
the Space Traders chapter, though, is in part a response to the tale.  It is written by the narrator 
alone as a letter to Crenshaw.  See id. at 195-200.
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written account may be only an abbreviated summary.202
Historical criticism would seek to situate the tale within not only its current history but 
the history to which it alludes.203  The story itself recounts prior consideration of emigration 
programs (voluntary and involuntary) for African-Americans.204  It also briefly relates as a 
telling example of a required sacrifice by blacks  the original constitutional compromise that 
permitted slavery.205  It  recalls as well the American resettlement and confinement of Japanese 
Americans during World War II.206  Commentators such as Michael Olivas have observed that 
the space trade is analogous to other events in United States history: “Not only have Blacks been 
enslaved, . . . but other racial groups have been conquered and removed, imported for their labor 
and not allowed to participate in the society they built, or expelled when their labor was no 
202See John Dominic Crossan, The Parables of Jesus, 56 INTERPRETATION 247, 249 
(2002) [hereinafter Crossan, The Parables of Jesus] (arguing that the gospel parables are plot 
summaries of oral presentations that would have taken “much longer,” perhaps an hour).
203See PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 4.
204See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 168 (citing schemes by Benjamin 
Franklin and other abolitionists to free slaves and return them to Africa and Lincoln’s support for 
emigration plans).
205Id. at 188.  Bell discusses this sacrifice at much greater length in another fictional 
narrative, The Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction.  See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT 
SAVED, supra note 143, at 26-42.
206See id. at 191.
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longer considered necessary.”207
To move from this historical criticism to literary criticism might seem to deflect attention 
from the vision of the United States this history reflects, but that is not the case.  Rather, the 
move to literary criticism on the basis of this history helps illuminate the potency of the literary 
critical insight.  Recognition of this history could suggest to some that Bell’s tale is 
fundamentally allegorical: a recapitulation in fictional form of this historical trail of woe.  If it is 
true, though, that The Space Traders forces us to face this history, it acts not only to challenge us 
to remember as our history a past we would rather forget.  Instead, it asks us to confront the fact 
that this history operates in our present and may presage our future.  The tale does act as a 
parable: it reverses the assumed view of progress toward racial harmony and requires us to face 
the role of white self-interest in our nation’s decisions.  The tale is unsettling, disturbing, and 
upsetting, precisely to the extent it is not simply a fictional fantasy.  The allegorical elements in 
The Space Traders–its evocation of the history analogous to the trade at issue in the story–add to 
207Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather’s Stories, and Immigration Laws:
The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 429 (1990) (citing the 
removal of the Cherokee from Georgia, the importation of Chinese workers followed by the 
Chinese Exclusion laws, and the importation of Mexican laborers under the Bracero Program, id.
at 430-39).  See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle of the Space 
Traders: Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color if the Price Were Right?, 62 U. C OLO L. 
REV. 312, 323-24 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle] (same).  
Bell has acknowledged Olivas’s work here.  See Bell, The Power of Narrative, supra note 144, at 
345.
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the power of the work as a parable. 
C.  Bluebeard’s Castle
Bell’s recounting of Bluebeard’s Castle208 is distinctive.  Instead of presenting his own 
narrative creation, he uses a traditional French fairy tale (as retold operatically by Bela Bartok) to 
explore the “unkept promises” of American racial justice.209  Judith marries Bluebeard and on 
entering his castle sees seven locked doors.  So that she can more fully share his life, Judith asks
her husband to open the doors, but he initially refuses.  Over time, she does gain the keys from 
him one door at a time.  To her horror, behind each door are symbols of his malevolent reign: 
weapons of torture, armaments, gold, jewels, and so on.210  Bluebeard beseeches Judith not to 
open the seventh and last door, but she does.  Inside are his former wives, still alive.  Bluebeard 
gives her no choice but to join them, and the opera ends as he closes the door upon her.211
Bell’s exploration of the story is overtly allegorical.  The first six doors stand for episodes 
in the United States’s racial history where in each a promising door was opened and then closed.  
First, the Emancipation Proclamation212 freed slaves in Confederate territory, but it provided no 
208Bell, Bluebeard’s Castle:  An American Fairy Tale, in BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, 
supra note 143, at 155.
209Id.  For a recording of the opera, see BELA BARTOK, BLUEBEARD’S CASTLE, Columbia 
Records recording 1963, MS 6425.
210BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 156.
211Id. at 156-57.
212Emancipation Proclamation, No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
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substantive rights that would prevent resubjugation.213 Second, passage of the post-Civil War 
constitutional amendments214 suggested promise, but narrow judicial construction rendered the 
protection basically meaningless.215 Third, accomplishment of the hopes of Brown216 has 
remained elusive.217  Fourth, the aim of the Civil Rights Act of 1964218 to remediate racial 
discrimination in areas such as employment has not been fulfilled.219 Fifth, the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965220 led to thousands of new black voters, but in response, techniques such as 
gerrymandering have been used to dilute the black vote.221  Sixth, some affirmative action 
policies have brought improvement, but resistance against them remains strong.222 Bell’s 
213BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIes, supra note 143, at 160-61.
214U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV.
215BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 161-62.
216Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
217BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 162.
218Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
various sections of 42 U.S. Code).
219BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 163.
220Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 
various sections of 42 U.S. Code).
221BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 163-64.
222Id. at 264.  For Bell’s more recent reflections on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which 
addressed affirmative action in the educational context, see BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra
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allegory acknowledges that “change in the racial landscape” has occurred.223  But the process is 
not one simply of ascending progress.  Instead, while doors do open, they also get shut.224
Bell’s recourse to the tale of Bluebeard’s Castle turns from allegory to parable in the 
following two ways.  First, the tale is not simply a useful vehicle in which to explore American 
racial history.  For the historical recounting ultimately returns to the message of the story.  As 
Bell relates, Bluebeard responds to Judith’s request that the castle be opened to outside wind,
sun, and light with this blunt retort: “Nothing can enlight this castle.”225  The tale powerfully 
evokes the message: sun and light will not come; racism has its permanence.226  Bell comments:  
“The [racial] tableau changes with the times, but its structure and final outcome remain 
constant.”227  As in Bell’s other narratives, the twist of the tale as applied to racial relations 
upsets our norms and expectations.  We presume a continuing path of progression in race 
relations, and Bell jolts us, upsets us, disorients us.  As in the prior tales we have discussed, the 
disorientation reorients us to a sober, chastened view of the historic and present plight of the 
United States’s racial minorities.  In Bell’s return from an allegorical appropriation of the tale to 
note 143, at 147-59.
223BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 165.
224Id. (“Thus, despite breakthroughs, we find ourselves in the midst of an increasingly 
grim national scene.”).
225Id. at 159.
226This theme is an enduring one in Bell.  Recall the subtitle of Bell’s work FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM.  See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1.
227BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 159-60.
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the tale’s own confounding message, he transforms the literary character of the telling from 
allegory to parable.
The second twist in Bell’s use of the story goes further.  It remains true that “[n]othing 
can enlight this castle,”228 and yet, somehow, there is also still room for hope–a seventh door that 
remains  yet to open, the door of the United States’s racial future.229  The metaphoric, 
“revelatory”230 power of the tale offers a second level of reorientation.  The comparison of 
Bluebeard’s tale with American racial relations is, once again, an allegory, but the juxtaposition 
has poetic, transformative power.  And the contrast with the biblical parables or the two prior 
fictions of Bell’s that we have depicted is provocative.  In all these, the transformative power of 
the story occurred now, in the reading.  In the language event of the parable,231 “just so does the 
Kingdom of God break abruptly into human consciousness . . . .”232  In the Racial Preference 
Licensing Act,233 the appeal to “[r]acial realism”234 arises out of a transformed realization of the 
228Id. at 159.
229Id. at 167.
230Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
231FUNK, LANGUAGE, supra note 37, at 220.  See also PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE 
OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 16, at 138, 146, 178 (same).
232CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 23, at 65-66.  See also RICOEUR, FIGURING THE 
SACRED, supra note 61, at 165 (“[T]he kingdom of God is not what the parables tell about, but 
what happens in parables.”).
233BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47.
234Id.
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situation in which we now find ourselves.  The Space Traders235 pushes us to confront the reality 
now of white self-interest.236  By contrast, what is distinctive about the second level of the 
transformation offered in Bluebeard’s Castle is that it exists as something potential, possible, not
something actual or present.  Bell writes:
America, too, has a Seventh Door.  Behind it there is the potential for self-
revelation for whites as well as blacks.  Salvation for all is possible if its light can 
reveal the destructiveness of whiteness, can provide an antidote to its corrupting 
influence, a corrective for its mesmerizing hypnotic spell.  The door will not be 
opened until blacks become insistent or when political or economic conditions 
dictate this long-overdue revelation.237
As evident from the quotation, Bell here does not discard his harsh critique.  Change will occur 
only when “blacks become insistent”–racial realism–or “when political or economic conditions 
dictate”–white self-interest.  But there is a door and revelation can occur.  Consistent with the 
histories of the prior doors, Bell is not sanguine how lasting the effects of the door’s opening will 
be or whether in fact the door will remain open.238  But there is possibility nonetheless.  Bell’s 
response here is  consistent with his larger corpus: on the one hand, racism is permanent but, on 
the other, it remains worthwhile to fight the struggle against it.  As I argue elsewhere, this 
tension marks an enduring paradox in Bell’s work, but, as I also argue, it is a living paradox, not 
235Id. at 158.
236Id. at 171.
237Id. at 167.
238Id. at 167-68.
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a contradiction.239  For present purposes, the literary insight is that the transformative power of 
the parable as a narrative includes an openness both to what is and to what may be possible.240
Bluebeard’s Castle comprises one of Bell’s “Afrolantica Legacies” in the book of the 
same name.  Afrolantica is a fictional creation of Bell’s that first appeared in the tale, The 
Afrolantica Awakening, a chapter in Faces at the Bottom of the Well. 241 Afrolantica was a giant 
land mass that arose unexpectedly in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.242  As explorers to the 
land found, it had a special pecularity: its air could be breathed by blacks but not whites.243  In 
239See Taylor, Racism as “the Nation’s Crucial Sin,” supra note 200.
240This balance between the real and the aspirational is also an important theme in the 
work of my colleague, Jules Lobel.  Lobel writes:
Those who view justice not as a mere norm but as a turbulent river, “a fighting 
challenge, a restless drive,” are continually operating on the fault line between 
current reality and human aspiration, between what is and what ought to be.  
Success in navigating the river requires maintaining the tension between reality 
and aspiration, between what is and what ought to be, between our reach and our 
grasp.
JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY:  LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 9 (2003) [hereinafter LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY] (citations 
omitted).
241See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 32-46.
242Id. at 32-33.
243Id. at 33-35.
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fact, blacks venturing on to the land underwent an experience of “heightened self-esteem, of 
liberation, of waking up.”244  Many blacks contemplated migrating to Afrolantica’s shores, but 
when the first group of ships arrived, they were met by the entire land mass sinking back into the 
ocean.245  As the ships turned around to go back to the United States, people on board discovered 
they were not in fact dismayed.  “[T]he miracle of Afrolantica was replaced by a greater miracle.  
Blacks discovered that they themselves actually possessed the qualities of liberation they had 
hoped to realize on their new homeland.  Feeling this was, they all agreed, an Afrolantica 
Awakening, a liberation–not of place, but of mind.”246
As an Afrolantica legacy, Bluebeard’s Castle intends to elicit a similar liberation of 
mind.  The liberation is one of openness and of possibility.  In the concluding pages of 
Afrolantica Legacies, Bell’s fictional counterpart, Geneva Crenshaw, says to narrator Bell that 
Afrolantica is real.  Unlike Camelots and Shangri-las, which “all are envisioned as escapes from 
the real world,” Afrolantica is instead  “a reflection of that world: one offering a perspective that 
enlightens and encourages people wherever they are.”247  Bell’s fictions are parables: they have 
poetic power, they transform, they reorient by disorienting.  They manifest both what is–the 
realities now unfolded by critique–and the possibilities of what may be.248  What Bell ascribes to 
244Id. at 35.
245Id. at 45.
246Id. at 45-46.
247BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 172.
248See Derrick Bell, Commencement Address–Howard University School of Law, 38 
HOW. L.J. 463, 470 (1995) (arguing for communication of “a view of what is against a 
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critical race theory in general applies directly to his own work: it is “transformatively 
aspirational.”249
D.  The Gospel Light
Bell’s story The Gospel Light concludes his book Gospel Choirs250 and provides an apt 
conclusion as well to our discussion of Bell’s narratives.  In this tale the narrator and his wife251
attend a church service where Geneva Crenshaw preaches the sermon.  The heart of Crenshaw’s 
sermon is the following story.  Melodie is the daughter of a minister, and she has an exquisite 
singing voice.252  While her father and his church do not approve of gospel music, Melodie finds 
as she grows older that the gospels speak to her.253  She decides upon the ministry as a vocation, 
background of what might be”).  The openness to what may be is utopian but utopian in its best 
function, as “exploration of the possible” rather than as escape, “the completely unrealizable.”  
RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, supra note 65, at 310.  This clear-minded 
utopianism has been visible in Bell’s writings since his first work of fiction, And We Are Not 
Saved.  That book’s final chapter calls for a “Third Way” between black emigration and violent 
struggle.  Bell explicitly acknowledges that this proposed alternative is “utopian,” but he wants 
to carve out a space for a prospect that is as yet “difficult to envision.”  BELL, AND WE ARE NOT 
SAVED, supra note 143, at 255.
249Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 177, at 906.
250See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 143, at 203-14.
251See id. at 214.
252See id. at 207.
253See id. at 208.
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graduates from divinity school, and then serves in her father’s church.254  On her father’s death, 
she submits her name for consideration as the church’s pastor.255  The church is reluctant, both 
because she is a woman and because another, male candidate is preferred.256  The church 
nevertheless permits her to offer a trial sermon, and on that day she decides to preach in song, 
more particularly, in gospel hymns.257  The sermon “should have opened all but blinded eyes and 
sealed hearts,” but blinded eyes and sealed hearts are what she meets.258 “Everyone was stunned 
by the beauty of her music, but determined–despite some inner turbulence– not to be moved by 
it.”259  Melodie is rejected as minister, and the male candidate is appointed instead.  Later church 
records indicate that gospel hymns have become congregation favorites.260
The tale operates at several levels: on the role of women in employment and in 
relationships,261 on the abiding spiritual power–to which the book is dedicated–of gospel 
254See id. at 208-09.
255See id. at 211.
256See id.  The subtext here is that Melodie and the other candidate, Shadrach, have the 
beginnings of a relationship, see id. at 209, and Melodie knows that if she continues in the 
competition, Shadrach will cease the relationship.  See id. at 211.
257See id. at 213.
258Id.
259Id.
260Id. at 214.
261Bell has thematized this subject in numerous narratives.  See, e.g., Bell, Shadow Song, 
in BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 143, at 91 (discussing and showing respect for issues of 
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songs,262 and on the failure of listeners to hear.  It is the last theme that I want to emphasize here.  
At this level, the story is allegorical: a tale not only about listeners’ failure to hear the gospels 
but to hear Bell himself.  The story is ultimately parabolic, because it challenges our assumption 
that we have heard.  Bell asks us really to hear.
If we have noted, though, that for Bell a fundamental task is “to make people see,”263 he 
also repeatedly acknowledges his awareness that people will refuse to see, refuse to listen, refuse 
to understand.  As in the parable of the Sower, his message is sown on diversely receptive 
sexual orientation); Women to the Rescue, in BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 143, at 152 
(discussing how “blacks must deal with sexism and patriarchy in our communities before we can 
address effectively the continuing evils of racism,” id. at155); The Entitlement, in BELL, GOSPEL 
CHOIRS, supra note 143, at 188 (discussing the fictional development of sexual entitlement 
therapy, where physical intimacy cannot proceed unless the relationship is based on equality and 
respect, see id. at 197); The Last Black Hero, in BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 
65 (discussing interracial relationships); The Race-Charged Relationship of Black Men and 
Black Women:  The Chronicle of the Twenty-Seventh-Year Syndrome, in BELL, AND WE ARE 
NOT SAVED, supra note 143, at 198 (discussing the difficulty professional black women have in 
finding and establishing relationships with black men).
262See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 143, at 3-4 (describing the “spiritual 
nourishment that is the essence of this music’s appeal,” an essence that has “a universality 
capable of touching all who hear and needs its comfort, its consolation,” a potential “to touch and 
unite across barriers of race and class”).
263Id. at 60.
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ground.264  At times Bell analogizes his efforts to the role of a prophet.  “About the least dire fate 
for a prophet is that one preaches, and no one listens; that one risks all to speak the truth, and 
nobody cares.”265  Elsewhere he recurs to similar imagery.  “The power of prophesy does not 
guarantee conversion.  Most people reject predictions founded in truth as unreasonable 
inconvenient, or frightening.  That is why true prophets are more likely to be persecuted than 
praised.”266 An essential part of the reason that Bell has developed and argued for racial realism 
is that because of self-interest, whites have chosen not to listen to messages about the need for 
racial reform.  Racial realism replaces exhortation to do the right thing with economic analysis 
and incentives.  Recall Bell’s words in his discussion of Bluebeard’s Castle: “[T]here is the 
potential for self-revelation for whites as well as blacks. . . . The door will not be opened until 
blacks become insistent or when political or economic conditions dictate this long-overdue 
revelation.”267  Bell’s narratives disrupt our categories, our orientation, our understanding in 
order to move us to a place where the critique, through disorientation, opens us to paths of 
reorientation.  In an interview, Bell cites approvingly Audre Lorde’s statement that one cannot 
destroy the master’s house with the master’s tools.268  Bell’s fictional narratives travel a path 
264See Mark 4:3-8.
265BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 157.
266BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 33.
267Id. at 167.
268See Andrea McArdle, An Interview with Derrick Bell, in ZERO TOLERANCE 243, 249 
(Andrea McArdle & Tany Erzen eds., 2001) (citing Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never 
Dismantle the Master’s House, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK:  WRITINGS BY RADICAL 
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alternative to the master’s tools of doctrinal legal analysis in order to disorient and reorient.  As 
in Bluebeard’s Castle, though, he recognizes that despite his efforts, readers may refuse to hear, 
and the door of possibility may, yet again, close.269  Bell comments elsewhere, “The presentation 
of truth in new forms provokes resistance, confounding those committed to accepted measures 
for determining the quality and validity of statements made and conclusions reached, and making 
it difficult for them to respond and adjudge what is acceptable.”270
If the door closes, for Bell the task is to take up the struggle once again.271  For the reader 
or listener, the primary task is to understand one’s own obligation to hear.  As parables, Bell’s 
tales reorient, they bring forth something new.  We cannot judge them according to accustomed 
or conventional criteria.  In their poetic function, they incarnate “a concept of truth that escapes 
the definition by adequation as well as the criteria of falsification and verification.  Here truth no 
longer means verification, but manifestation, i.e., letting what shows itself be.”272  To listen is 
first to understand, not to critique; we must open ourselves to “the possible mode of being-in-the-
world which the text opens up and discloses.”273  For access to the meaning of a text, we must 
read with “imagination and sympathy.”274  Bell can make manifest, can disorient in order to 
WOMEN OF COLOR 98, 99-100 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981)).
269BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 168.
270BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 143.
271See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 143, at 174.
272RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 102.
273RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 121, at 177.
274LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, THINKING BIBLICALLY, supra note 47, at xvii.
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reorient.  But the reader or listener bears responsibility also.  Ricoeur writes, “This hearing which 
understands is the crux of our problem.”275
III.  Narrative
  In this Part, I want to situate Bell’s stories within a strand of more general approaches to 
narrative and, on the basis of our discussion of parable, offer some responses to criticisms of 
narrative in legal scholarship.
Narratives can operate in a number of ways.276  Given the emphasis on parables–
including Bell’s–as reorienting through disorientation,277 I particularly want to attend the 
function of disorientation as explored in general narrative analysis.  Kathryn Abrams and 
Richard Delgado, two of the most prominent scholars of legal narrative, describe variously how 
narratives can act as “paradigm-shifting,”278 as rupturing279 and revelatory,”280 as jarring or 
275RICOEUR, THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 450.
276See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law:  New 
Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2104 (1989) (characterizing how symposium 
participants “describe or use multiple sorts of stories:  stories that bridge, providing connections 
between people of different experience, stories that explode (like grenades) certain ways of 
thinking, stories that mask, devalue, or suppress other stories, stories that consolidate, validate, 
heal, and fortify (like therapy), and even stories that maim or ‘spirit murder’ and so should not be 
told at all”) (footnotes omitted).
277See supra text accompanying notes 98-102, 184.
278Kathryn Abrams, The Narrative and the Normative, IN REPRESENTING WOMEN:  LAW, 
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displacing,281 as “shatter[ing] complacency and challeng[ing] the status quo.”282  In part legal 
narrative acts to disrupt the doctrinal form of analysis of legal discourse; stories challenge non-
stories.283  Legal narrative acts as well as a “counterstory” to jar majoritarian stories.284  The 
LITERATURE AND FEMINISM 44, 50 (Susan Heinzelman & Zipporah Wiseman eds., 1994) 
[hereinafter Abrams, The Narrative and the Normative].  See also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the 
Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1035 (1991) (same).
279Kathryn Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1121 (1998) 
(reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7).  See also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge, 
Gaylegal Narratives] (describing a gaylesbian “story of rupture and resistance”).
280Kathryn Abrams, Unity, Narrative and Law, 13 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS & SOCIETY
3, 5 (1993) [hereinafter Abrams, Unity, Narrative, and Law].
281Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School:  A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 665, 670 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, On Telling Stories] (responding to Daniel 
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School:  An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School]); Richard 
Delgado, Shadowboxing:  An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 818 (1992) [hereinafter 
Delgado, Shadowboxing] (“jar . . . or displace”).
282Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:  A Plea for Narrative, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists].
283See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 199 (1991) 
(characterizing Bell’s use of the fictional Geneva Crenshaw as an “instrument by which to attack 
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challenge posed by these counterstories is twofold.  First, they unmask as stories what the racial 
majority deem to be “truths”285 and “objective standards.”286  Second, the counterstories 
“displace or overturn . . . [these] majoritarian myths and narratives.”287  Counterstories can 
expose the lie contained in majoritarian narratives.288  They challenge “accounts by which 
majoritarians make sense of their world; stories such as: without intent, no discrimination; 
outright racism is rare and sporadic; we have all the civil rights legislation we need–any more 
would disadvantage innocent whites; some cultures unfortunately have less ambition and ability 
the monolithism of white patriarchal legal discourse. . . . She is the fiction who speaks from 
across the threshold to the powerful unfiction of the legal order; [she is a] destroyer of the 
rational order”).  
284See Delgado, On Telling Stories, supra note 281, at 670.
285See id. (“Majoritarians tell stories . . . but with the conviction that they are not stories 
at all, but the truth.”).
286See Delgado, Shadowboxing, supra note 281, at 818 (discussing how for actors who 
have been in positions of power, “their subjectivity was long ago deemed ‘objective’ and 
imposed on the world”).
287Id.
288Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Racial Realism:  A Commentary on White Optimism 
and Black Despair, 24 CONN. L. REV. 527, 530 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Derrick Bell’s 
Racial Realism].  Delgado continues:  “It is no accident that Bell has a tremendous underground 
circulation and a status in the minority community of color.  We know that his message is true.”  
Id.
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than others; and so on.”289 Counterstories provide a means for undermining the 
“presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings” that on the one hand are little 
attended and simply presumed and that on the other form the cognitive grounds on whose bases 
legal and political decision occurs.290
Narratives also operate differently than arms-length, “objective” doctrinal analysis.  They 
seek from their readers more than simple rational or abstract understanding; understanding of a 
narrative is affective, more lived, “visceral.”291  Narratives as well seek to lure the reader into a 
story; they work noncoercively292 and insinuatively293 as they ask the reader to “suspend 
judgment.”294 Narratives ask the reader to reconcile two worlds: the text’s and the reader’s.295
If, however, the reader refuses to be open to the text’s world but stands steadfast in his or her 
289Delgado, On Telling Stories, supra note 281, at 671.
290Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra note 282, at 2413.  
291Abrams, The Narrative and the Normative, supra note 278, at 53.
292Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform:  Will We Ever Be 
Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 947 (1988); Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra note 282, 
at 2415 (same).
293Richard Delgado, Brewer’s Plea:  Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 13 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Brewer’s Plea].  See also Delgado, Storytelling for 
Oppositionists, supra note 282, at 2415, 2435 (same).
294Id. at 2415.  See also id. at 2440 (same).
295See id. at 2435.
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own,296 the story’s goal–to make one see297–will fail.298
I take the work of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry299 as representative of the 
opposition to narrative.  Farber and Sherry understand in abstraction the claims raised by 
narrative advocates:  that narratives “are powerful means for both creating and destroying 
mindset”300 and “have a persuasive power that transcends rational argument.”301  Farber and 
Sherry themselves acknowledge that narratives “can be a source of empathetic understanding”302
and “can sometimes significantly affect their audiences.”303 But they argue that narratives should 
296See Delgado, Brewer’s Plea, supra note 293, at 13 (“Stories require suspension of 
disbelief.”).  See also Abrams, Unity, Narrative, and Law, supra note 280, at 25 (noting the need 
for a “receptive audience”).
297See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 60.
298Delgado, Brewer’s Plea, supra note 293, at 13.
299See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7; Farber & Sherry, 
Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 281.  See also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 
200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov:  Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 647 (1994).
300FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 31.
301Id. at 39.  I return to the issue of narratives’ ability to “transcend[] rational argument.”  
See infra text accompanying notes 310-12.
302Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 281, at 830.
303Id. at 826.  
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be assessed according to “conventional standards of truthfulness and typicality,”304 and it is these 
criteria that I wish to explore. 
My contention is that Farber and Sherry comprehend truthfulness and typicality on the 
basis of adequation to existing norms, whereas narrative as reorientation by disorientation acts 
on the basis of the manifestation of new norms, new truths.  I shall argue that the criterion of 
typicality should be incorporated into the criterion of truthfulness, but let me move toward that 
point by discussing some of the limitations of typicality on its own terms.  For our purposes, 
recourse to typicality fails on at least two grounds.  First, sometimes the injury or story may not 
be “typical” in the sense of one that happens to the majority of a class–think of racial lynching, 
for instance–yet it is one deserving attention and redress on its own and one that may as well 
reflect deeper, more “typical” racial animosity.  The story is both an  individual story and a 
deeper, broader story.  Further, typicality does not adequately encompass the stories told by 
those who see more deeply.  Think, for example, in the Western tradition of the role of the 
religious prophet–an analogy drawn by Bell305–or of Plato’s allegory of the cave in the 
Republic.306  In both, truth lies in what is seen, not in its being acknowledged as typical.  For 
304Id. at 854.
305See supra text accompanying notes 265-66.  Jules Lobel also distinguishes between the 
prophetic and the current, majoritarian view.  The value of prophecy is determined not by 
success according to current norms but by transformation in the long-term.  See LOBEL, SUCCESS 
WITHOUT VICTORY, supra note 240, at 106, 116.  
306Plato, The Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 575, 747-50 (Paul 
Shorey trans., Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
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someone like Bell, the truth of his work should not depend on it being judged as typical, for its 
“typicality”–the pervasiveness of the racial injustice that he intends to describe–is acknowledged 
only if we first understand–have manifested in us–its underlying truth.307
So the question becomes the “truth” of Bell’s or any narrative that acts to reorient by 
disorientation.  Farber and Sherry raise the issue here as one of the “veracity and verifiability” of 
a story.308  Recall, though, Ricoeur’s criticisms of this approach.  Analysis has been so “heavily 
determined by the history of the principles of verification and falsification” that it has become 
difficult for the standard approach “to conceive of a concept of truth that would not be taken for 
granted and defined a priori as adequation.”309  By contrast, Ricoeur wants to articulate and 
defend another approach to truth, one that “escapes the definition by adequation as well as the 
criteria of falsification and verification.  Here truth no longer means verification, but 
manifestation, i.e., letting what shows itself be.”310  For narrative–and in particular, as I have 
argued, Bell’s narratives311–truth is measured as manifestation, not adequation.312
307As throughout, the analogy here to the prophets and to Plato, as earlier to the Jesus’s 
parables, is not to equate Bell’s status with these figures but to indicate a methodological 
similarity in how truth is disclosed.
308FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 99.
309RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 39, at 36 (referring 
specifically to linguistic analysis).
310Id. at 102.
311See Part II supra.
312Kathryn Abrams argues that narratives “offer new understandings of what ‘truth’ as a 
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Yes, a criterion of truth as manifestation presents problems.  As Farber and Sherry 
anticipate, it is difficult to know how to appraise a criterion that seems to rely on an intuitive 
“flash of recognition” and that may be susceptible to a reader’s reaffirmation of his or her own 
preconceptions or biases.313  Ricoeur himself acknowledges a certain circularity in 
understanding: to understand one must live “in the aura of the meaning that is sought.”314  There 
is also a certain circularity between understanding and critique.  Critique is possible, but only 
after “reading and interpretation with imagination and sympathy.”315  This circularity is 
undeniably frustrating for parties on both sides:  for those narrators who maintain they are not 
understood because the reader has not, in the narrators’ view, sufficiently opened themselves to 
the story being told, and for those who criticize the story and are in turn criticized for not 
understanding.316  Stories assisted by internal or supplementary analysis–the dialogues, for 
example, following many of Bell’s narratives between Bell and the fictional Geneva Crenshaw–
criterion for belief might be . . . they challenge the notion that ‘truth’ must be established by 
comparison with an external point of reference,” that is, by adequation to given, external norms.  
Abrams, Unity, Narrative and Law, supra note 280, at 22.
313See Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 281, at 836-37.
314RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 298.
315LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, THINKING BIBLICALLY, supra note 47, at xvii.
316See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 281, at 851 
(“[F]or those readers who neither resonate or recognize, and for those who passionately disagree 
[with a story], there is no way to enter the dialogue.”).
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can provide some common grounds of analysis for both narrator and reader.317  But the issue of 
the primacy of manifestation remains.  A new truth, it is contended, is being told, and this new 
truth may reorient by disorientation, by unsettling existing norms, existing truths.  To really 
understand, one must really listen.
To reject manifestation because of its methodological uncertainties is to reject the 
possibility of there being new truths that have yet to be disclosed.  It is difficult to comprehend, 
however, how Farber and Sherry’s interpretive model can accommodate itself to the possibility 
of manifestation rather than only to adequation, and this in turn raises questions about the 
adequacy of their interpretive approach.  Farber and Sherry endorse a model of legal 
pragmatism.318  Legal pragmatism is not formalist in its reasoning and allows for a range of 
cognitive tools to be employed in reaching a judgment.319  Their own form of pragmatism is 
317Farber & Sherry have argued that narratives do not contain analytic elements but 
simply story.  See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 86, 99; 
Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 281, at 809.  Richard Delgado has 
strongly criticized this argument, offering Bell’s work as an exemplary counterexample of a 
more typical critical legal narrative.  See Delgado, On Telling Stories, supra note 281, at 670.
318See FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 132-33.
319See id. See also Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis:  Legal Pragmatism for the 
Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 169 [hereinafter Farber, Reinventing Brandeis] 
(“The pragmatist’s judicial decision will rarely claim to rest on a single premise.  Rather than 
using the metaphor of the foundation as a means of support, pragmatists prefer to speak of a web 
of beliefs or a many-legged stool.”).
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conservative320 in the descriptive sense that it relies considerably on the weight of tradition.  As 
Farber writes separately:
The pragmatist philosophers were keenly sensitive to the importance of tradition 
. . . as a necessary ingredient in all human reasoning.  For the pragmatists, 
tradition was . . . the essential foundation for intellectual and social progress.  
Consistency with the past is, as Holmes said, as much a necessity as a virtue, for 
“[t]he past give us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination.” . . . . 
[C]reativity and innovation do not arise from a rejection of tradition but rather 
from a full embrace of it . . . .321
Setting aside the question of the accuracy of this characterization of pragmatist approaches more 
generally, Farber’s statement is revealing about the methodology that he and Sherry adopt.
Consider again this statement from the longer quotation:  “Consistency with the past is . . . as 
much a necessity as a virtue, for ‘[t]he past give us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our 
imagination.’”322 This is a methodology of adequation, and it is an approach that a methodology 
open to manifestation rejects as insufficient.323  Compare Ricoeur’s definition of tradition.  
320See Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, supra note 279, at 612-13, 626 (characterizing 
Farber and Sherry’s approach as “conservative pragmatism”).
321Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 
1344-45 (1988) [hereinafter Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution] (quoting OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139 (1920)).
322Id. (citation omitted).
323One of the most intriguing aspects of Ricoeur’s philosophy of imagination, see 
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Tradition is “not the inert transmission of some already dead deposit of material but the living 
transmission of an innovation always capable of being reactivated by a return to the most 
creative moments of poetic activity. . . . In fact, a tradition is constituted by the interplay of 
innovation and sedimentation.”324
This definition of tradition can be contextualized within the larger dimensions of 
hermeneutics, to whose development Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer are the principal 
contemporary contributors.  In my view, hermeneutics provides the broad interpretive domain 
within which narratives such as Bell’s and, more generally, the poetic and the parable may be 
located typically at the more disruptive end of the spectrum.  Hermeneutics argues that 
understanding does not arise simply on the basis of applying what has come before (a 
sedimentary notion of tradition) to the instance at hand (the story being told or the legal case at 
issue).  Instead, the pre-existing whole (the tradition, the existing norm of understanding) is 
informed by the part (the instance of application), and understanding of the part is informed by 
the whole; each informs the other.  As Gadamer argues, application involves “co-determining, 
supplementing, and correcting [a] principle.”325  Commentator Joel Weinsheimer explains that 
RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IMAGINATION, supra note 115, is that he denies that the past fixes the 
limits of our imagination.  For Ricoeur, this pragmatist approach is one of reproductive
imagination, but there is another sphere of productive imagination, where, interestingly, fiction 
plays a notable role.
3241 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 68 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer, 
trans. 1982) [hereinafter 1 RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE] (emphasis added).
325GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 120, at 39
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this means that neither the interpretive rule “nor the instance to which it is applied is antecedent 
to the other;” their relationship is “reciprocal rather than unilateral.  Each term modifies and acts 
on the other so that they interact.”326  The particular is not assessed in terms of its adequation to 
existing norms, for these norms may be informed by, transformed by the incorporation of the 
particular.  Something new is seen, and that recasts the previously existing whole.  
Frank Michelman discusses similarly the notion of practical reason.  “Judgment mediates 
between the general standard and the specific case. . . . This process, in which the meaning of the 
rule emerges, develops, and changes in the course of applying it to cases is one that every 
common law practitioner will immediately recognize.”327  The hermeneutic process of 
application is not extreme or extraordinary, but part of everyday interpretation.  Existing 
interpretive norms are reassessed and reintegrated as part of the routine process of application to 
new situations.  It is insufficient to rest application on an adequation to prior norms and rules.  In 
the process of application, something new occurs, something new is made manifest, and that 
truth must be incorporated into a recast set of norms.  In the typical process of application, as in 
typical common law development, the new that appears may be a slight difference from the old 
326JOEL WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY 80 (1991) 
[hereinafter WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY]; see also
JOEL WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS:  A READING OF TRUTH AND METHOD 192 
(1985) (“[T]he general is . . . is continually determined by the particular, even as it determines 
the particular.  Application is not reductive but productive . . . .”).
327Frank I. Michelman, Foreword:  Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
28-29 (1986).
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and change may be very incremental.328  But the more major disruptive power of the narrative, as 
of the poetic and the parable, is simply a more extreme version of the same process.329  It may be 
328See, e.g., Eskridge, Gaylesbian Narratives, supra note 279, at 630:
A more positive lesson of pragmatism is that in the longer run, opinions are more 
plastic.  One’s “stock of old opinions” and experiences is itself dynamic.  If one’s 
opinions adjust a little for every story detailing persecution of responsible, 
patriotic gay and lesbian or straight military personnel by unreasoning or under 
handed investigators, the cumulative range over a number of years might be 
substantial.
329Perhaps this interrelation of the more modest process of application with the disruptive 
and reorientative process of the poetic or the parable may help overcome objections to the notion 
of manifestation.  One of the criticisms of manifestations is that some claim ignorance of 
“‘disclosure’ as an ‘event’ in understanding.  They say that this is not their model for what it is to 
understand . . . .”  Frei, The “Literal Reading” of Biblical Narrative, supra note 112, at 55 
(endorsing this position).  The more minute occurrences of disclosure in the moment of 
application may make more credible the possibility of larger “events” in the poetic moment.  A 
second criticism, voiced by Farber and Sherry, is that reports of “conversion” on the basis of a 
story are “scarce.”  Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 281, at 826.  
Perhaps, though, the repetition of exposure to a message in stories can slowly bring a reader to a 
changed orientation.  Recall Eskridge’s statement, supra note 328.  It is a different point if a 
reader refuses to change positions.  See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
On other grounds, Mark Tushnet claims that Bell’s narratives fail because “our society 
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troubling that there is no more formal or uniform way to resolve the relationship between the 
general and the particular at the moment of application; different interpreters will resolve the 
interrelation in different ways.  But that is the reality with which we are faced.  Denial of the 
truth that a new manifestation may bring leaves us very partial and limited in our understanding.
Farber himself quotes positively Michelman’s statement.330  Farber’s work also includes 
assertions that pragmatism “can encompass both tradition and prophecy.”331  It is difficult to 
find, however–whether in Farber’s own work or the work he has co-authored with Sherry–
incorporation of the role that manifestation of the new may play.  Their work more centrally 
seems predicated on Farber’s phrase:  “Consistency with the past is . . . as much a necessity as a 
virtue, for ‘[t]he past give us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination.’”332
lacks a similar set of shared assumptions.”  Because of societal diversity, different readers will 
react to Bell in different ways.  Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 
GEO. L.J. 251, 274 (1992).  Again the response would be that in the moment of application, 
readers are being asked to challenge their existing assumptions and to revise and recast them as a 
result of their encounter with the new, with the new truths that Bell claims to expose.  Whether in 
fact this will occur is the distinguishable issue of the nature of reader response.  But it is not 
sufficient methodologically for Tushnet simply to observe differing assumptions as a starting 
point.  The question is whether the narrative can help overcome or bridge these differences.
330Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:  Statutes, Formalism, and the 
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 538 (1992).
331Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 319, at 181.
332Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, supra note 321, at 1344-45 (citation 
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Emphasis on adequation alone does not allow room for manifestation.  There is more than one 
kind of reason,333 more than one approach to discovering the truth.334  Farber and Sherry quote 
omitted).
333This point is emphasized in Jay Mootz’s review of Farber and Sherry.  See Francis J. 
Mootz, III, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 
10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 605 (1998) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, 
supra note 7).
334Essential to Farber & Sherry’s project is a defense of the Enlightenment.  See, e.g., 
FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 27 (“At least since the 
Enlightenment, knowledge has been thought of as universally accessible and objective.”).  One 
way to view the contest between advocates of narrative and Farber and Sherry is that the debate 
here parallels a similar debate within the Western tradition:  between the Enlightenment and its 
antagonist, Romanticism.  Consider Isaiah Berlin’s depiction of the two.  See ISAIAH BERLIN, 
THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM (Henry Hardy ed., 1999).  The use of symbol was central to 
romantic thought, id. at 99, because of its attention to dimensions of depth.  Id. at 102.  
Romanticism tried to express symbolically what “could not be expressed literally.”  Id. at 100.  
The effort was to convey something “immaterial” using “material” means.  Id. at 102.  
“Whatever description I give always opens the doors to something further, . . . but certainly 
something which is in principle incapable of being reduced to precise clear, verifiable, objective 
prose.”  Id. at 103.  The romantic stance was dramatically distinguishable from the 
Enlightenment’s appeal to a knowable, objective truth.  Id. at 105.
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Brandeis: “‘If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.’”335  The 
lesson, they immediately add, is:  “Those of us in the mainstream must remain open-minded; we 
must not be afraid to learn from others.”336  This does not seem a lesson that Farber and Sherry 
have adequately incorporated.  Recall Ricoeur’s phrase: “This hearing which understands is the 
crux of our problem.”337  The crux of the narrative problem is the failure to hear that leads to the 
failure to understand.338
335FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 142 (quoting New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  Farber also quotes this 
passage in the final sentence of his more lengthy essay on Brandeis.  See Farber, Reinventing 
Brandeis, supra note 319, at 190.
336FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 142.  See also id. at 107 
(noting the qualities “‘that a search for truth reflects–such as open-mindedness, humility, [and] 
tolerance . . . .’”) (quoting William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First 
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1995)).
337RICOEUR, THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 119, at 450.
338Cognitive psychologist Howard Gardner writes:
Unless one is committed to religious fundamentalism, one should always remain 
open to changing one’s mind; it is worth attending to ideas that have affected 
many others, even when one personally finds little of value in them.  Our thought 
processes sharpen when we wrestle with these ideas, and it is even possible that 
we might eventually find merit in the ideas that we once rejected. . . . [A]wareness 
of resistance is valuable both to the creator of new vision and to the individual 
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IV.  Narrative as Idealistic?
After having explicated and situated Bell’s narratives on their own terms, it is now 
appropriate, in this final Part, to enlarge the frame of reference.  For those, including Bell, who 
employ narrative to challenge racism, is the weight they grant to narrative too superficial a tool 
to effect change, is it too idealistic, too much attentive only to contexts of discourse?  Should the 
sources of racial entitlement and change be acknowledged rather as more fundamentally 
predicated upon material factors?339  These questions have been provocatively posed by my 
colleague Richard Delgado.340  Delgado differentiates between idealist and materialist schools of 
who initially resists a strange and exotic presentation–possibly because it hits too 
close to home.
GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS, supra note 110, at 127.
339Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys:  A Critical Examination of Recent 
Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 123 (2003) [hereinafter Delgado, Crossroads] 
(reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes, 
Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002) and BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 
143.
340See, e.g., Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 339; Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think 
About Race, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279 (2001) [hereinafter Delgado, Two Ways].  The division between 
materialism and idealism has been a significant one in Delgado’s writings for years.  See, e.g., 
Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes–Interest 
Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 370-71 (1992) 
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racial critique:
An “idealist” school holds that race and discrimination are largely functions of 
attitude and social formation.  For these thinkers, race is a social construction 
created out of words, symbols, stereotypes, and categories. . . .  A second school 
holds that while text, attitude, and intention may play important roles in our 
system of racial hierarchy, material factors such as profits and the labor market 
are even more decisive in determining who falls where in that system.  For these 
“realists,” racism is a means by which our system allocates privilege, status, and 
wealth.341
Delgado expresses primary adherence to the materialist school.342
To do adequate justice to Delgado’s position would take a separate article; here let me 
explore only a select few of Delgado’s points.  Proper appreciation of Delgado’s stance requires 
reconciliation of his materialist orientation with his role as one of the most prominent advocates 
of legal storytelling.343 We must also understand how Delgado can criticize idealism and yet 
[hereinafter Delgado, Explaining].
Delgado writes frequently with Jean Stefancic.  I shall try to be explicit in the text when 
referring to works written by Delgado alone and when referring to works that are co-authored 
with Stefancic.
341Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 339, at 123-24.
342See, e.g., id. at 152; Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 340, at 2285.
343See supra text accompanying notes 278-82.
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demonstrate great respect for Bell’s work344 and, indeed, can identify Bell as another preeminent 
member of the materialist school.345  As an example of a materialist approach, Delgado describes 
Bell’s thesis of “interest convergence”:346  racial change in the United States, including decisions 
such as Brown v. Board of Education,347 have occurred not because of white’s ethical altruism 
but because of white self-interest, including fears of domestic disturbance and international 
reputation.348  Change occurred not because of discourse, argument, or persuasion but due to 
material conditions.  Let me offer another, related example.  Bell argues that the racism’s 
perdurance owes to white’s maintenance of a property right in whiteness.  “[T]he set of 
assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accompany the status of being white can become a 
valuable asset that whites seek to protect.”349  The advantages are again material: economic, 
political, and psychological.350
Yet in helping us assess the difference between materialism and idealism, the theme of a 
344See, e.g., Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 339, at 146-50.
345See, e.g., id. at 137-38; Delgado, Explaining, supra note 340, at 371.
346See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest 
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
347347 U.S. 483 (1954).
348Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 339, at 137-38.  For prior discussion of Bell’s theme 
of white self-interest, see supra text accompanying notes 197-200.  
349Derrick Bell, Revised Opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, in WHAT BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185, 188 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
350Id. at 185.
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property right in whiteness raises two provocative points.  First, for whites low on the economic 
ladder, maintenance of this property right may be actually contrary to their economic interests.  
They identify with whites at the economic top rather than ally with blacks of an economic class 
similar to their own; in fact they blame blacks of their economic class for being the source of 
their problem.351  These whites act against their own best economic interests.  A material
interest–here the property right in whiteness–is not necessarily equivalent to an economic
interest.  Second, this material interest is founded in a cognitive structure.  The status ascribed to 
whiteness is based not on biology352 but on belief, a belief supported and confirmed in white 
culture.353
Let me generalize the point.  Part of the essential scholarly contribution of Bell and 
Delgado is that they argue against and seek to replace inadequate current cognitive models of 
351Derrrick Bell, Racism:  A Major Source of Property and Wealth Inequality in America, 
34 IND. L. REV. 1261, 1270-71 (2001).  As Bell recognizes, this result is contrary to his interest 
convergence thesis.  See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 143, at 165.
352Yes, some still may believe the difference is biological, but that is not the case for 
most.
353In his new book, Bell cites as a principle here the notion of “hegemony,” a belief, 
reinforced by the social structure, in the value of the current social order.  See BELL, SILENT 
COVENANTS, supra note 143, at 187.  So, as noted above, see supra text accompanying note 350, 
whiteness can have economic, political, and psychological value, but that is a result of a status 
that exists in the head, not in biological reality.  As the text now goes on to argue, cultural status 
is a cognitive phenomenon that has real, empirical consequences.
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racial change.  In Bell’s view, the assumption of the traditional civil rights community that 
racism would be progressively eradicated has failed.354  As we saw in discussion of The Racial 
Preference Licensing Act,355 Bell argues that the fight against racism should rely less on the 
“idealism” of ethics and more on the “racial realism” of economics.356  Bell’s realism wants to 
oust idealism, but racial realism is itself a cognitive model that intends to supplant another, failed 
cognitive model.  In their work, Delgado and his frequent co-author Jean Stefancic have coined 
the term “empathic fallacy” as a way of criticizing the belief that idealist vehicles such as speech, 
dialogue, exhortation, and remonstrance will lead to individuals’ reforming their views.357 Why 
do these vehicles fail?  We are not autonomous entities who choose among competing ideas.  
Instead, we bring to debate a pre-existing structure of understanding.
In an important sense, we are our current stock of narratives, and they us.  We 
subscribe to a stock of explanatory scripts, plots, narratives, and understandings 
that enable us to make sense of–to construct–our social world.  Because we then 
354Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1992).
355See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47-64, discussed supra, text 
accompanying notes 148-90.
356See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 49.
357See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and 
Culture:  Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1276, 
1281 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider].  See also id. at 1261 
(“[T]he empathic fallacy[] consists of believing that we can enlarge our sympathies through 
linguistic means alone.”).
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live in that world, it begins to shape and determine us, who we are, what we see, 
how we select, reject, interpret and order subsequent reality.358
Racism is itself part of the “dominant narrative” that comprises the understandings on the basis 
of which we reason, and these dominant narratives resist change.359  In its reliance on dialogue 
and exhortation to effect change, the empathic fallacy is too idealistic.  Note, though, that like 
Bell, Delgado and Stefancic challenge idealism on the basis of an alternative cognitive structure.  
“[W]e are our current stock of narratives . . . .”360  As they write elsewhere, “The devices by 
which we construct and make sense of our social world are largely linguistic, consisting of 
categories, concepts, and particularly narratives.”361  Cognitive structures themselves have a 
materiality; inextricably they provide a framework, an interpretive density, through which and by 
358Id. at 1280.  Among those cited in support at the end of this quotation, see id. at 1280 
n.166, are the first two volumes of Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative.  See 1RICOEUR, TIME AND 
NARRATIVE, supra note 324, & 2 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE (Kathleen McLaughlin 
& David Pellauer trans., 1984).  As I will later suggest, I agree that Ricoeur says we are 
structured by our narratives, but I will argue that for Ricoeur these narratives can change, as in 
metaphoric moments.  See infra text accompanying notes 386-88.
359Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra note 357, at 1279.
360Id. at 1280 (emphasis added).
361Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives:  Can Judges Avoid Serious 
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1957 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and 
Narratives].  See also id. at 1953 (“[W]e are all situated actors, constituted in large part by the 
‘stories’ or narratives by which we understand and impose order on reality.”).
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means of which we understand.362 Material actions undertaken by the civil rights community–
dedicated labors of untold years–may not achieve the desired goal if they are pursued according 
to an insufficient cognitive understanding of racism’s modality.  At times, Delgado writes, a 
“gestalt switch” may be necessary.363  We may need “to examine the legal background–the 
bundle of assumptions, baselines, presuppositions, and received wisdoms–against which the 
familiar interpretive work of courts and legislatures takes place.”364  If we fail at this cognitive 
task, “all the rest is shadowboxing.”365  Delgado argues that the search must be undertaken both 
for the “broad structures” that have led to racial and other forms of suppression and for those that 
362Bell, for example, describes how at the time Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was being 
decided, segregation was not simply aberrant.  Rather, he writes, “[i]t was the dominant 
interpretive framework for a social structure that organizes the American garden’s very 
configuration.  Segregation . . . consolidated the imaginative lens through which Americans 
would now conceive race.”  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 143, at 82 (emphasis added).
Paul Ricoeur pursues the larger argument here at greater length.  In contrast to the 
Marxist division between an economic infrastructure and superstructure of ideas, Ricoeur argues 
that concepts themselves inform and are part of the infrastructure.  RICOEUR, LECTURES ON 
IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, supra note 65, at 223.  Action has a symbolic structure, and this 
symbolic structure is constitutive of action.  Id. at 82.
363Delgado, Shadowboxing, supra note 281, at 823.
364Id. at 823-24.
365Id. at 824.
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may replace them with true equality and democracy.366  Cognitive structures should be included 
within both of these lists.367
If cognitive structures have a materiality, then what becomes of Delgado’s distinction 
between idealist and materialist forms of racial critique?  The distinction remains vital on two 
grounds.  First, Delgado argues that recent racial critique has been disproportionately idealist in 
366Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 340, at 2296.
367See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to Dismantle That Famous 
House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 307 (2000) (“Sometimes . . . one needs to turn a thought 
structure on its side, look at it from a different angle, and gain some needed distance from it, 
before the path to liberation becomes clear.”); Delgado, Brewer’s Plea, supra note 293, at 6 
(“We needed new ideas and theories–sometimes if you are up a tree and a flood is coming, you 
have to climb down before climbing up a taller one.”); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why 
Do We Tell the Same Stories?:  Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix 
Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 223 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell 
the Same Stories?] (arguing that the ideas of divergent individuals such as Bell “offer the 
possibility of legal transformation and growth.  Like nature’s mutant or hybrid, they offer the 
infusion of new material needed to retain the vitality of our system of thought.”).
The status of the present Article should likewise be conceived as an attempt to displace a 
prevalent conceptual structure–one defining understanding on the basis of its adequation to 
existing norms–with a new conceptual structure–one expanding understanding to allow 
manifestation of the new.  Both of these conceptual structures have a materiality; they provide an 
interpretive lens through which data is assessed, explained, and understood.
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orientation.  Critique has focused “almost exclusively on discourse at the expense of” attention to 
issues such as power, history, and other social, political, and economic determinants of racial 
fortune.368  “Ideal factors–thoughts, discourse, stereotypes, feelings, and mental categories–only 
partial explain how race and racism work.  Material factors–socioeconomic competition, 
immigration pressures, the search for profits, changes in the labor pool, nativism–account for 
even more, especially today.”369  Delgado seeks to redress an imbalance.  At this level, both 
idealist and materialist analysis can coexist, and Delgado’s encouragement of a materialist 
perspective does not undermine the space for an account, such as this Article’s, that emphasizes 
discourse analysis.  In turn, for my part, the present Article’s concentration on cognitive 
structures rather than questions of power or history does not intend to denigrate work in these 
other areas.370  To be more precise, the issue the Article addresses is the need for 
368Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 339, at 122.
369Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 340, at 2280.  See also Delgado, Crossroads, supra
note 339, at 123-24.
370The brevity of these remarks on the importance of this material work might seem a 
form of academic genuflection:  a brief, honorific show of purported respect, while regard really 
lies elsewhere.  Let me suggest why that suspicion is, I hope, mistaken in the present case.  The 
time I spent as a boycott organizer in Los Angeles for Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Workers left 
a lasting impression about the relationship between organizing and legal rights.  Legal discourse, 
including legal rights, do not arise and are not maintained without organizing, without expression 
of political power.  In the legal literature, this relationship is especially well articulated in the 
work of Staughton Lynd.  See, e.g., Staughton Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity 
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acknowledgment of cognitive structures that allow entrance of Bell’s disruptive arguments, 
arguments that advance theses about very material subjects such as interest convergence and 
whiteness as property.
At a second level, however, Delgado’s endorsement of materialist over idealist 
approaches is more challenging. The claim is that recourse to materialist analysis is necessary as 
a matter of efficacy: materialist factors create change; idealist factors largely do not.  Change 
occurs on the basis of social, political, and economic movement, not on the basis of narrative.  
Recall Delgado and Stefancic’s coining of the empathic fallacy: we are constituted by our 
stories, and later discourse–the introduction of new narratives–will not move us, will not create 
fundamental change.371
after Union Recognition:  A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 726 (1975).  William 
Eskridge endorses a similar recognition in the gay and lesbian movement.  See, e.g., Eskridge, 
Gaylegal Narratives, supra note 279, at 632 (“information and persuasion will be unavailing 
unless backed up by power and protest”) (citing the views of Franklin Kameny).  The present 
Article’s attention to cognitive understanding assesses therefore only one aspect of a much larger 
picture.
371See Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra note 357, at 1261:
[T]he empathic fallacy[] consists of believing that we can enlarge our sympathies 
through linguistic means alone.  By exposing ourselves to ennobling narratives, 
we broaden our experience, deepen our empathy, and achieve new levels of 
sensitivity and fellow-feeling.  We can, in short, think, talk, read, and write our 
way out of bigotry and narrow-mindedness, out of our limitations of experience 
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We are all situated actors, whose selves, imaginations, and range of possibilities 
ared constructed by our social setting and experience.  We are, in a sense, our 
current narratives.  Thus, an unfamiliar narrative invariably generates resistance; 
despite our best efforts, counterstories are likely to effect at most small, 
incremental changes in the listener or reader.372
Under this critique, even if this Article is successful is establishing that uses of narratives such as 
Bell’s make manifest something new and so cannot be evaluated according to existing norms of 
adequation, this thesis seemingly has more theoretical than actual import.  Because narratives 
that seek to transform–including Bell’s–will continue not to persuade.  As we have discussed 
throughout, readers will resist the narrative.  
In the face of Delgado’s challenge, does my thesis about the nature of Bell’s narrative 
have any remaining heft, any actual import?  Let me answer by trying to respond to the most 
pointed question raised by Delgado’s critique: why does Delgado, why does Bell, materialists 
and perspective.  As we illustrate, however, we can do this only to a very limited 
extent.
372Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 361, at 1933.  See also
Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science:  Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal 
Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 961 (1991) (“[M]ost audiences will generally react to the 
reformer’s message with either anger or puzzlement.  Members of the control group will be 
angry:  How dare they use that argument against us?  And persons not members of either the 
insurgent or the control group will respond with puzzlement:  I thought they meant the [status 
quo] by justice.”).
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both, continue to write?  This response itself has four differentiable levels.  First, writing can 
take the form of truth-telling, whether it is efficacious or not.  This element is more overt in Bell.  
Bell writes, for instance, “We’re a race of Jeremiahs, prophets calling for the nation to repent.”373
As previously noted,374 Bell goes on to acknowledge: “About the least dire fate for a prophet is 
that one preaches, and no one listens; that one risks all to speak the truth, and nobody cares.”375
Truth-telling voices objection and protest; it does not let those living falsely to go free, even 
where it does not change minds.376  Speaking the truth also can provide the writer some sense of 
integrity, of refusal to acquiesce.377  Second, even where the narrative does not change the minds 
of a racial majority, it can act as a counterstory supporting the story of racial minorities; it tells 
the truth of their story.378  The value of story for these communities must be underscored.  Third, 
373BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 157.
374See supra text accompanying note 265.
375BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 157.
376See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle, supra note 207, at 328 
(“[S]torytellers have directed their attention to the oppressors, reminding them of a day when 
they would be called to account.”).  
377See, e.g., BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 143, at 161.
378See Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Racial Realism, supra note 288, at 530 (“Our need, then, 
is for counterstories that reveal the lie implicit in the thousands of majoritarian narratives and 
sub-narratives according to which we are inferior, according to which our lowly estate is 
deserved. . . . It is no accident that Bell has a tremendous underground circulation and status in 
the minority community of color.  We know that his message is true.”).
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the counterstory urges that the majoritarian story is neither the only story nor a necessary story.  
The current social system is not a closed system; alternatives exist.  Counterstories, writes 
Delgado, “can open new windows into reality, showing us that there are possibilities for life 
other than the ones we live.  They enrich imagination and teach that by combining elements from 
the story and current reality, we may construct a new world richer than either alone.”379  As we 
have discussed, this notion of possibility is an essential element of Bell’s writings, as we 
discerned most directly in his narrative, Bluebeard’s Castle.380  The work of Delgado and Bell is 
“transformatively aspirational.”381
These three levels of response remain independent of the challenge Delgado raises at a 
fourth and final level: does critical race narrative change the perspective of those in the white 
majority?  Response here must itself proceed in several steps.  First, let us enlarge the question:
379Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra note 282, at 2414-15.  See also Delgado 
& Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle, supra note 207, at 328 (noting, using the example of the 
Bible, that “storytellers for oppressed groups” can tell “tales of hope and struggle–for example, 
that of the Promised Land–to inspire and comfort the community during difficult times.  Reality 
could be better–and, perhaps, will be.”).
380See supra  text accompanying notes 228-49.
381Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 177, at 906 (discussing critical 
race theory in general).  As previously intimated, see supra notes 65, 115, 248, & 323, I am 
especially interested in the role played in Delgado’s and Bell’s work by imagination and utopia, 
particularly imagination where productive rather than just reproductive and utopia as exploration 
of the possible rather than as escape.
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can minds change?  Cognitive psychology suggests the answer is yes.  In a recent work Howard 
Gardner argues:
[M]ost mental representations are neither given at birth nor frozen at the time of 
their adoption.  In our terms, they are constructed over time within our 
minds/brains and they can be reformed, refashioned, reconstructed, combined, 
altered, and undermined.  They are, in short, within our hands and within our 
minds.  Mental representations are not immutable; analysts or reflective 
individuals are able to lay them out, and, while altering representations may not 
be easy, changes can be effected.382
Gardner’s research indicates that mind change most likely occurs when the following factors 
operate together: reason, research (supporting data), resonance (affective support), 
representational redescriptions (multiple reinforcing representations), resources and rewards that 
can be drawn upon, and background real world events.383  Notice that material factors are 
relevant to the ideational change.  And yet they do not determine the change.  Cognitive elements 
retain a certain autonomy.  Gardner alludes, for example, to the role of imagination.384  More 
broadly, the possibility of mind change indicates that we need not be simply the product of our 
biological, cultural, and historical heritage.385
382GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS, supra note 110, at 46.
383See id. at 15-17.  I later return to Gardner’s seventh factor, which may negate change:  
resistance.  See infra note 392.
384See id. at 47.
385Id. at 211-12.  This judgment may conflict with Delgado and Stefancic’s conclusion 
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In attempting to conceptualize more precisely the nature of mind change, I would revert 
back to our prior discussion of the hermeneutic relationship between whole and part.  At the 
moment where understanding is attempted, we bring to bear the pre-existing “whole” that we 
are–the various elements of our background and tradition, social, cultural, historical, and 
cognitive.  These interpretive norms are brought to bear on the “part”–the element that is new.  
And the hermeneutic argument is that the whole does not subsume the part but that each informs 
the other.  The part can modify and act on the whole and vice versa.386  Think of this action even 
more precisely through a return to the operation of metaphor.  Metaphor–the “part” newly 
introduced–displaces a given order–a prior “whole”–in order to present a new order.387 Now 
incorporate these functions of metaphor and application into the operation of narrative.  
Narrative does not operate as a form of arms-length logic; it works affectively, disruptively.  
Existing norms are challenged; their sufficiency is questioned.  The parable of the Good 
Samaritan asks the listener to hold together two contradictory elements:  neighbor and 
Samaritan.388  Narrative does not simply offer an alternative order; it undermines the integrity of 
the order previously held dear.  Parable, metaphor, and narrative can create change.
that “our ability to escape the confines of our own preconceptions is quite limited.”  Delgado & 
Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra note 357, at 1281.  Observe that the debate here 
concerns the material nature of our cognitive structures.
386See WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY, supra
note 326, at 80.
387See RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 65, at 22.
388See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
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And yet we must again face the fact of potential resistance.  Delgado and Stefancic argue:  
“Divergent new narratives, ones that could jar and change us, always spark resistance . . . .”389
The fact of resistance is recognized also biblically,390 in Bell,391 and in psychologist Gardner.392
Yet even if conversion is rarely instantaneous, perhaps the unsettling of prior logic by narrative 
can create a crack, a wedge, that can be progressively opened incrementally over time by new 
narratives, just as drops of water can eat into stone.  The typically incremental nature of change 
is recognized by Gardner393 and is a possibility that Delgado and Stefancic acknowledge.394  But 
even this “optimism” about narrative may be more suspect, write Delgado and Stefancic, “when 
applied to evils, like racism, that are deeply inscribed in the culture.”395  Bell’s prognosis is 
unrelentingly more dire: “[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of 
389Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 361, at 1953.
390Recall the parable of the Sower, Mark 4:3-8.  See supra text accompanying note 112.
391See supra text accompanying notes 263-70.
392GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS, supra note 110, at 18 (“[M]ind changing is unlikely to 
come about when the resistances are strong, and the other factors do not point strongly in one 
direction.”).
393See id. at 102.
394See Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 361, at 1933 (“[A]n 
unfamiliar narrative invariably generates resistance; despite our best efforts, counterstories are 
likely to effect at most small, incremental changes in the listener or reader.”).
395Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra note 357, at 1281.
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this society.”396
A paradox seems at work in Bell397 and also in Delgado and Stefancic.  The structures of 
racism are perduring, resistance to racial change is strong, and yet they continue to write.  In part 
their writings, including their narratives, are distinctive because they offer more material 
perspectives and strategies–for example, attention to interest convergence and to local and 
international labor markets–that act as alternatives to what they find to be failed idealistic models 
based on dialogue and discourse.398  And yet these more material arguments are writings, 
writings that attempt to persuade.  The paradox is that the structures of racism are enduring, yet 
these writings suggest all hope is not lost.  The possibility that a reader will be moved by a 
396BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at xiii.  For additional citations to similar 
propositions in Bell, see Taylor, Racism as “The Nation’s Crucial Sin,” supra note 200, at 
272-73.
397Elsewhere, see id., I discuss as a central theme the paradox in Bell’s work between his 
thesis that racism is permanent and his continued efforts to write and act against it.
398I should acknowledge too that in his most recent work arguing for materialist against 
idealist models of racial change, Delgado’s principal intended audience is other scholars within 
critical race theory.  See Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 339; Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 
340.  The possibility of persuasion may be more available when the reader’s views are closer in 
spectrum to the author’s.  Yet the remaining distances may well make persuasion difficult here as 
well.  More generally, if there is at least the possibility of persuading someone of similar but not 
identical views, then perhaps this is additional evidence that we are not simply cabined within 
our own interpretive worlds but can bridge gaps between us.
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parable or a narrative is not foreclosed; the reception of the metaphorical twist399 is 
unpredictable.  We do not know ahead of time whether the reader will be indifferent, will resist, 
or will be reoriented by the disruptive manifestation of the new.  At the end of his new book, 
Silent Covenants, Bell quotes Robert Gordon: “‘Things seem to change in history when people 
. . . act[] as if . . . they could change things; and sometimes they can, though not always in the 
way they had hoped or intended; but they never knew they could change them at all until they 
tried.’”400 For Bell, as for Delgado and Stefancic, one must do what one can; and one of the 
399See RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 65, at 99 (alluding to MONROE C. 
BEARDSLEY, THE METAPHORICAL TWIST, 22 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
293 (1962)).
400BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 143, at 200 (quoting Robert Gordon, New 
Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 413, 424 (David Kairys ed., 1990)).
For Delgado and Stefancic’s appreciation of the availability and effectiveness of a 
narrative twist, I was struck by their quotation of the following passage from Michel Foucault as 
an epigraph at the beginning of one of their articles:
“This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that 
shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thoughtour 
thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geographybreaking 
up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to 
tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to 
disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and 
the Other. . . . 
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available tools is narrative, narrative that can reorient by disorienting, narrative that can make 
manifest something new.
Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?, supra note 367, at 207 (quoting
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS:  AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES xv 
(1973)).
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